On 29 July 2026, the China Development Institute (CDI) in Shenzhen hosted an SCO Think Tank Webinar on the proposed SCO Development Bank, following the political consensus reached at the 2025 Tianjin summit. The event brought together experts from China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, India and Pakistan, including former senior officials from the Reserve Bank of India and the Eurasian Development Bank.
Shairbek Juraev, Co-Founder and President of Crossroads Central Asia, spoke on the panel. Complementing the financial expertise represented at the webinar, his remarks focused on the political conditions that would determine whether the bank could become a credible operating institution.
The SCO has remained workable partly by avoiding binding commitments. Members with unresolved rivalries, different levels of exposure to sanctions and distinct foreign-policy orientations cooperate selectively while retaining considerable freedom of action. A development bank would alter that logic. It would require long-term capital commitments and common rules, bringing forward questions that the organisation has so far been able to postpone.
The experience of existing lenders points in the same direction. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank built credibility through professional risk management, open procurement and cooperation with established multilateral banks. These standards helped it secure strong credit ratings and broad membership. The New Development Bank demonstrates both progress and limitations. Member currencies accounted for roughly a quarter of its cumulative portfolio by the end of 2024, while the bank suspended new transactions in Russia after 2022.
With Russia and Iran as full members of the SCO, a future bank would need to determine how far it intended to rely on international capital markets. Rating agencies and correspondent banks would price compliance risks regardless of individual members’ positions on sanctions.
Local-currency settlement presents additional constraints, including unbalanced trade flows, limited currency convertibility and concern among some members that a renminbi-centred system could replace one form of currency dependence with another. Juraev argued that the bank should begin with corridors where trade volumes are already substantial and expand in response to demonstrated commercial demand.
For smaller member states, meaningful participation would depend on four conditions: a focused mandate; governance arrangements that give smaller shareholders a genuine voice; lending that creates sustainable domestic value; and a clear distinction between projects that build productive capacity and those valued primarily for political visibility. Project preparation is another frequently overlooked need. A dedicated preparation facility could be as valuable to smaller economies as an additional lending window.
Juraev concluded that SCO members face a choice between two broad models. One would be a modest bank with a limited mandate and high operating standards, working alongside the AIIB and other established lenders. The other would be an ambitious political project positioned as a cushion against sanctions and an alternative to the dollar-based financial system. The first could plausibly be established within a few years. The second may remain beyond the organisation’s institutional capacity.