On 14 September 2026, Dr Shairbek Juraev spoke on the opening panel of the first Central Asia–UK Think Tank Forum, hosted by the International Institute for Central Asia (IICA) in Tashkent. Joining online, he contributed to the panel on the future of Eurasian connectivity with remarks on the Middle Corridor’s place in the region’s wider connectivity.
The remarks treated the Middle Corridor as one part of a broader process that combines closer links within Central Asia with the region’s integration into global transport networks. Among the many connectivity initiatives of recent decades, it stands out because it connects the region to its two largest economic partners, China and Europe.
For Central Asia, diversification was a necessity. The region inherited transport and energy infrastructure built almost entirely towards Russia, and for years alternative routes were costly, of limited interest to China or Europe, and open to veto from the north. China’s overland push from 2013, Europe’s search for routes avoiding Russia and, most consequentially, Russia’s war against Ukraine changed that calculation. Equally important was the region’s own opening since 2016–2017, led by Uzbekistan, which reopened borders and eased freight movement across Central Asia.
For China and Europe the corridor remains a marginal channel, and Central Asia should be realistic about the limits of its indispensability. For the region itself the stakes are larger: usable connections in every direction and an end to dependence on a single northern route. Within Central Asia, however, the Middle Corridor runs essentially through Kazakhstan. For Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, what matters is feeder links into the trunk routes. The China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway is the clearest case: its value for Kyrgyzstan lies in ending a long position at a transport dead end more than in any role in China–Europe transit.
Looking ahead, the remarks argued for building domestic and intra-regional links first, including the border crossings between the five states. The binding constraint is now soft infrastructure. Harmonised tariffs, joint customs and digital data exchange attract far less financing than ports and railways, because they cross sovereignty and no single government owns them. External partners, the UK among them, could contribute most on this less visible layer, including insurance, arbitration and workable financing frameworks, rather than through further corridor strategies or feasibility studies.