Crossroads Commentary 25-02-2025
The inauguration of a new U.S. president in January 2025 has triggered a geopolitical shift, felt keenly in Central Asia. Policy changes enacted by President Trump remain a moving target for analysts, but their impact on the region will likely have two manifestations: first, America’s relations with Central Asia’s major partners—Russia, China, and the European Union; and second, a recalibration of the “interests vs. values” dichotomy in U.S. foreign policy. Overall, while the ‘quiet death’ of democracy promotion brings relief to Central Asian leaders, they will likely face more of the “hard power” realities of international politics.
Indirect Impact: U.S. Relations with Central Asia’s Partners
The U.S.’s influence on Central Asia mostly depends on how it engages the region’s other partners. A potential thaw in U.S.-Russia relations—hinted at in Riyadh talks and discussions of sanction relief—could recalibrate Moscow’s stance in the region. Russia’s leverage, somewhat weakened by the Ukraine conflict, might regain strength if tensions with the West subside, prompting Central Asian states to tread even more carefully around Kremlin sensitivities.
Meanwhile, China continues deepening its economic grip through the Belt and Road Initiative, binding Central Asian economies to Beijing’s orbit. The U.S., determined to counterbalance China, may offer trade or investment incentives, particularly in critical mineral resources. However, Washington’s strategic distractions will likely allow China to entrench its economic influence further.
The European Union, struggling to reinvent itself as a geopolitical power amid U.S. alliance strains and Russia’s assertiveness, will likely adopt an even more pragmatic approach in its Central Asia relations. Yet Washington’s weakening transatlantic ties could diminish Europe’s sway in Central Asia. Regional leaders, ever pragmatic, will adjust their alignments accordingly, leveraging these evolving dynamics to their advantage.
Done with Democracy
The new U.S. administration’s full-scale retreat from democracy promotion removes a longstanding point of friction with Central Asian governments. Once a staple of Washington’s engagement, democracy advocacy has faded in favor of a stability-first approach. The result so far has been fewer lectures, but it remains to be seen if it leads to more handshakes.
This shift will likely weaken not only U.S. pressure on governance issues but also the European Union’s commitment to democracy and human rights in the region. Without strong transatlantic backing, European policies in these areas may become more pragmatic, further reducing external leverage on governance reforms.
This trend has already created challenges for civil society and independent media in the region. With less external support, they may face greater pressure from domestic authorities. However, the need for self-reliance could also strengthen their legitimacy, fostering deeper local roots and resilience. In the long run, this may push civil society actors to find new ways to sustain their work and engage with domestic audiences on their own terms. Meanwhile, free from ideological scrutiny, regional governments will continue prioritizing sovereignty and stability in their dealings with Washington and Brussels.
Critical Minerals and Strategic Partnerships
This pragmatic turn renews the U.S. focus on Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Central Asia’s economic and geopolitical linchpins. Kazakhstan’s vast reserves of critical minerals—essential for global supply chains—strengthen its strategic value to Washington. With its large population and ongoing reforms, Uzbekistan offers an appealing partner for trade, security cooperation, and investment.
The oft-cited C5+1 framework may remain a platform to bring the U.S. and all five Central Asian states together but will likely lose relevance, with actual engagement happening on bilateral basis. Washington prioritizes tangible gains—access to mineral wealth of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan—while smaller players like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan may find themselves further in the margins. Turkmenistan, with its energy resources, remains an exception, maintaining relevance despite its isolationist tendencies.
Overall, for Central Asia, the new U.S. presidency signals not disruption but recalibration. Russia’s evolving posture, China’s economic dominance, and Europe’s limited engagement set the broader context. The end of democracy promotion removes an irritant, while U.S. pragmatism cements Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as focal points. As ever, regional leaders will continue to balance major powers, seize strategic openings, and maintain flexibility in an increasingly multipolar order.
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