In a talk titled “Central Asia and the EU in 2025: What Has Changed, What Has Not”, Dr. Shairbek Dzhuraev, President of Crossroads Central Asia, examined the shifting dynamics between the European Union and Central Asia. Speaking at a conference hosted by the College of Social Sciences and Humanities at the University of Duisburg-Essen, he argued that the EU’s 2019 Central Asia Strategy — especially its emphasis on connectivity — was forward-looking but lacked a strong sense of urgency at the time. The strategy was seen as aspirational, reflecting cautious optimism about regional reforms, particularly in Uzbekistan. Only after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 did its actual relevance become clear: connectivity moved from a policy ambition to a strategic necessity, reshaping the foundations of EU–Central Asia relations.
The geopolitical shock of 2022 compelled the EU to “rediscover” Central Asia as a region of growing strategic value — geographically, economically, and politically. What felt like peripheral engagement has taken on new weight, with connectivity and diversification now central to Europe’s foreign policy agenda. This recalibration has transformed the region from a niche area of EU interest into a critical part of Europe’s broader response to global instability.
One of the most notable shifts is the EU’s increasingly differentiated approach. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have emerged as anchor states—both engines of regional cooperation and focal points for European diplomacy. High-level bilateral visits to Astana and Tashkent by European leaders mark a departure from the EU’s previous preference for region-wide, Brussels-led engagement. Tailored diplomacy is now seen as essential to advancing European interests in Central Asia.
Equally important is the growing role of individual EU member states. Where EU–Central Asia relations were once channeled almost exclusively through Brussels, countries like Germany, France, and Italy are now pursuing their own strategic partnerships in the region. This adds new political momentum and visibility, diversifying the diplomatic toolkit and signaling a deeper long-term commitment.
Central Asian leaders, for their part, are engaging with the EU in a more pragmatic manner. While continuing to balance relations with Russia and China, they increasingly view the EU as a practical partner, rather than a source of normative pressure. Regional cooperation, a previously rhetorical matter in Central Asia, has gained new momentum, creating opportunities for the EU (and extra-regional actors) to engage with the region as a whole.
Nonetheless, important constraints continue to shape the EU–Central Asia relationship. The EU’s institutional structure limits its capacity to act as a unified and agile foreign policy actor, particularly in strategically fluid environments like Central Asia. Moreover, while recent years have seen a shift toward more pragmatic engagement, the EU will not have fully resolved the tension between promoting values and pursuing interests. Its continued emphasis on democracy and human rights—alongside other priorities like connectivity and energy—can send mixed signals to Central Asian partners. At the same time, the region remains firmly committed to multi-vector diplomacy. The EU is increasingly relevant—but it is still one partner among several, and its influence will depend on its ability to offer strategic coherence, political realism, and sustained commitment.