On 8 December 2024, Bashar al-Assad fled Syria to Moscow, ending the Assad family’s 53-year rule. The collapse was the culmination of the Deterrence of Aggression offensive led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army. The new government, led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, has established a five-year transitional period until 2030, while foreign governments watch closely for signs of a slide into strict Islamist governance given HTS’s origins as al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra.

For Central Asia, the fall of Assad has reshaped a long-standing concern: the fate of Central Asian foreign fighters who travelled to Syria during the Civil War. These fighters can now be divided into two categories — those who fought with HTS and are being integrated into the new Syrian army, and those held in increasingly untenable ISIS detention camps in the Kurdish-controlled northeast. Both carry significant implications for regional security.

Integration into the Syrian Army

While exact numbers are unclear, reports suggest that at least 2,000 foreign fighters from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan went to fight in the Syrian Civil War — this figure excludes families. Estimates more generally suggest 8,000 to 18,000 foreign fighters and families are being held in detention centres in the Kurdish-controlled north. Around 3,500 of those who supported al-Sharaa have since been integrated into the new Syrian army’s 84th Division.

Given the green light from the United States, al-Sharaa’s government has chosen to integrate foreign fighters into the new Syrian army’s 84th Division, in a deeply risky strategy of “pragmatic normalisation”, or rather the “least bad option.” Out of almost 50 new military roles that have been announced, at least six have gone to foreigners. Most notably for Central Asia, Tajik national Saifiddin Tojiboev was reportedly appointed head of operational headquarters in the Ministry of Defence. The logic behind this comes from a global approach to terrorism which understands that expelling foreign fighters to their countries of origin would destabilise an even bigger geographical region, particularly as foreign fighters are often noted to be even more radical than Syrian and Iraqi soldiers in HTS.

On the one hand, if Central Asians choose to stay in Syria and be integrated into the army and society, it reduces the burden on Central Asia to process and rehabilitate every one of its citizens. Those who choose to return, already a self-selecting group, can be given more attention for a more successful chance of full rehabilitation. Keeping their job and pay ensures that extremists are occupied by a cause other than ISIS, and avoids the disastrous consequences seen by the American blacklisting of all Baathist party members during the invasion of Iraq, which partially led to the creation of ISIS itself.

On the other hand, Central Asian Islamic extremists are being legitimised through acceptance by the Syrian government. This reduces the visibility of punishment for Islamic extremism, which could lead to increased support for such movements. Moreover, established Central Asian extremists in Syria could turn into a source of advice and support for local cells in Central Asia, leading to regional instability through increased terrorist activity.

In balance, however, given that foreign fighters choosing to stay in Syria are less likely to be successfully deradicalised, integration into the Syrian army appears the better option for Central Asia itself, on the condition that greater funding is allocated for anti-terrorism and regional security to anticipate a potential surge. The immediate danger of a new regime expelling these fighters back to Central Asia has been averted — but this could change. Sectarian violence and the growth of an opposition movement could fragment the new government, and the opposition may increasingly view the integration of foreign fighters as the international community exporting its problem onto Syria. “Syria is free, non-Syrians must leave,” protesters said after the burning of a Christmas tree in a Christian neighbourhood of Damascus by foreign fighters in December 2024. Central Asian countries would be wise to plan for this likelihood, making the most of al-Sharaa’s delay of a jihadist exodus to develop policy on a sudden influx of highly radicalised fighters.

The Danger of ISIS Detention Camps

The ISIS detention camps in northern Syria present a separate and arguably more pressing challenge. The “powder-keg” prison camps are the most unstable factor in Central Asia’s repatriation challenge, particularly due to their potential for sudden collapse. Around 50,000 ISIS fighters and their families remain spread across 27 prisons and detention centres, 8,000 to 18,000 of whom are foreign fighters. A UN report in 2023 described open sewers, inadequate housing, limited access to basic necessities, routine violence, and sexual assault. While these camps restrict the ISIS terrorists of today, they simultaneously radicalise and unite a new generation of extremists — 60 percent of detainees at al-Hol and 63 percent at Roj are children, exposed to only ISIS ideology.

The Trump administration’s decision to cut all funding for Blumont, an NGO providing $117 million in essential camp services and security, has heightened the risk. In the first half of 2025 alone, ISIS carried out 149 attacks in northeastern Syria, killing 63 and targeting military outposts. The Syrian government’s relationship to these camps remains unclear, and HTS’s integration of foreign fighters into the army complicates matters further, as it is unclear to what extent HTS considers detained fighters potential allies.

Central Asia’s Repatriation Record

Central Asian countries must prepare for the possibility of these camps’ collapse. Fortunately, the region is in a much stronger position than many other countries. While UN Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014) called for states to develop prosecution, rehabilitation, and reintegration strategies for returning foreign terrorist fighters, most countries have been reluctant to repatriate — the UK’s removal of citizenship in the case of Shamima Begum is emblematic. Central Asian countries, by contrast, are world leaders in repatriation. By March 2024, over 2,100 individuals had been repatriated through humanitarian missions: Kazakhstan welcomed back 754 of its citizens, Uzbekistan 531, Kyrgyzstan 511, and Tajikistan 334.

Rehabilitation programmes differ from country to country, but share a common three-stage structure: (1) adaptation in supervised environments with psychological and medical attention; (2) rehabilitation; (3) reintegration into familiar environments alongside social support. Uzbekistan’s programme can be considered one of the most developed, integrating NGO support, supervised work placements, and the inclusion of otin-oyi (religiously literate women), as well as an imam, to help returning women adapt to local traditional forms of Islam. However, it should be noted that these programmes have largely catered for women and children who have voluntarily returned. The harder challenge of dealing with male fighters who personally committed crimes for ISIS remains largely unaddressed.

Looking Ahead

An in-depth report from the United States Institute of Peace advised, among other measures, the development of specific action plans for reintegration, reduction of stigmatisation of returnees, and building capacity at initial processing centres. These recommendations should now be developed to include emergency capacity — frameworks to rehabilitate those returned to Central Asia involuntarily, and methods focused on male fighters. A dual system of rehabilitation and imprisonment may be better suited to forced returnees from detention camps, considering the extremist organisation by ISIS loyalists seen in al-Hol camp. The simplified gendered view of women “fraudulently taken to this crisis-stricken country, where they were held hostage by terrorists” does not match the reality in all cases.

Al-Sharaa’s provisional government offers Central Asia a grace period to dramatically increase the capacity of rehabilitation programmes. The integration of Central Asian fighters into the Syrian army is, on balance, beneficial for regional stability, though greater attention to bonds between regional radical groups and new players in the Syrian army must be given. Efforts to repatriate Central Asians in untenable detention camps must be continued, and existing rehabilitation processes should be improved. Most crucially, Central Asian governments must plan for scenarios that would impact the region far more than al-Sharaa’s government currently does: civil war, an opposition that expels foreign fighters, or the collapse of ISIS detention centres could all trigger a sudden influx of radicalised individuals still loyal to ISIS.

Central Asia’s determination over a decade to repatriate its citizens from Syria is a positive, world-leading policy. If Europe is eventually forced to change its position on repatriation due to the imminent collapse of detention camps, Central Asia can offer advice and time-tested frameworks. The benefits would extend beyond regional security to improved international relations and the growth of Central Asia into a global leader on the issue of post-conflict rehabilitation.

This report is part of Crossroads Central Asia’s series highlighting analytical work by emerging scholars working on the region.

The post Central Asia’s foreign fighter dilemma in post-Assad Syria first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 and the rapid consolidation of power by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) marked one of the most consequential political shifts in the Middle East in over a decade. While regional and global actors, most prominently Turkey, Gulf states, the United States, Russia, and Ukraine, moved quickly to position themselves vis-à-vis the new authorities in Damascus, one group of states stood out for their restraint: the countries of Central Asia.

More than a year after Assad’s departure, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have largely avoided formal statements, bilateral initiatives, or clear diplomatic signalling toward the new Syrian government. This silence is striking not only because of Syria’s renewed geopolitical relevance, but also because developments in the Middle East often intersect indirectly with Central Asia’s own security and foreign-policy considerations.

This article argues that Central Asia’s muted response is not the result of indecision or neglect, but a deliberate and calculated strategy. At its core lies the uncomfortable positioning of post-Assad Syria within the broader Russia–Ukraine confrontation. As Moscow and Kyiv compete, both directly and symbolically, for influence in Damascus, any overt engagement with the new Syrian authorities risks being interpreted as a geopolitical alignment. For Central Asian states that remain economically and politically entangled with Russia, strategic silence – much like their approach to the Russia-Ukraine war itself – has emerged as the least costly option.

By examining how Russian and Ukrainian involvement in Syria has shaped Central Asian calculations, this article discusses the logic behind this restraint, the differences in approach among Central Asian states, and the conditions under which silence may eventually give way to cautious engagement.

PATTERNS OF CAUTION IN CENTRAL ASIAN RESPONSES

Public engagement between Central Asian governments and the new Syrian authorities has so far been minimal, confined to large international conferences. However, Central Asian ministers sharing a room with new Syrian officials has not always resulted in public interaction. The search “Syria” on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan’s website is blank. Tajikistan’s last formal interaction was on September 26, 2024 during the 79^th session of the UN General Assembly. In Kyrgyzstan’s case, the most recent entry on its MFA’s website mentioning Syria, published on December 10, 2024, focuses on the 22^nd Doha International Forum held on December 7-8, 2024. Despite the regime change unfolding on December 8, 2024, during the conference, the summary lists Syria only midway in a series of conflicts, an avoidant formulation that chooses to ignore Assad’s flight to Moscow on that very day.

In contrast to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have made limited public references to Syria since December 2024. The 51^st Session of the OIC Ministerial Council was the vehicle used by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for discussions with Syria outside of official bilateral diplomatic meetings, which would require a formal acknowledgement of regime change. Baxtiyor Saidov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Uzbekistan, held talks on the side of the session with Foreign Minister of Syria Asaad Hassan Al-Shaibani, during which “prospects for close cooperation were discussed”. Kazakhstan’s then Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu similarly participated in the session and mentioned the necessary “stabilization of the situation in Syria” and “taking into account the interests of the Syrian people”.

This report is part of Crossroads Central Asia’s series highlighting analytical work by emerging scholars working on the region.

The post Central Asia’s calculated silence on Syria first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

Two well-worn — yet enduring — metaphors are often used to describe the region: the “Great Game,” which casts Central Asia as a passive battleground for global powers, and the “Great Silk Road,” which presents it as a dynamic hub of connectivity. Acknowledging the limits of these narratives, Dr. Dzhuraev used them as a starting point to offer three core observations on the region’s evolving international role.

1. Central Asia is strategically situated—but politically bypassed

Central Asia sits at the crossroads of major powers, each with distinct modes of engagement. Russia’s presence remains deep but increasingly uncertain in light of its war in Ukraine. China has become the region’s largest economic partner, yet its engagement remains limited in cultural and human dimensions. The United States, meanwhile, approaches the region primarily through the lens of strategic concerns linked to Russia, China, and Afghanistan.

While all three powers shape the region’s choices, their rivalries do not translate into clear alliances. Instead, they compel Central Asia to balance, hedge, and maneuver—a skill the region has increasingly mastered.

2. Diversification is Central Asia’s main foreign policy logic

Faced with structural constraints—landlocked geography, limited infrastructure, and reliance on a narrow range of export routes—Central Asian states have embraced diversification not as a strategic ideal but as a necessity. Beyond the major powers, they have deepened ties with Turkey, the European Union, Gulf countries, India, Korea, and Japan. Formats like C5+1, in which South Korea was a pioneer, have become a regular feature of regional diplomacy.

This diversification seeks not only to broaden economic opportunities but also to reduce geopolitical vulnerability and strengthen the region’s autonomy in foreign policymaking.

3. Central Asia should not settle for transit corridor status

The global shocks of COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine have drawn renewed attention to Central Asia’s role in overland trade between Europe and East Asia. With maritime routes and Russian transit corridors becoming increasingly unreliable, the region has emerged as a key logistics artery.

However, Dr. Dzhuraev cautioned against embracing the notion of “corridor status” too readily. While new infrastructure and transit routes are welcome, he emphasized that Central Asia must avoid becoming merely a passageway between “proper rooms.” As he argued, “the region should not settle for being a geography that connects other people’s destinations. It must become a destination in its own right—a room of its own, not just a corridor in between.”

Achieving this requires transforming geographic centrality into economic centrality—through value-added production, regional integration, and long-term investment in human capital and innovation.

Dr. Dzhuraev concluded by noting that Central Asia is on a clearly positive trajectory, projecting confidence and seeking partnerships that reflect a renewed approach to international engagement. What will be critical going forward, he emphasized, is how inter-state and intra-state processes — particularly political leadership and governance — evolve to capitalize on the emerging context and to consolidate the region’s stability and development.

Crossroads Central Asia is proud to contribute to global conversations about Central Asia and its wider neighbourhood.

The post From corridor to destination: rethinking Central Asia’s role in the world first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

Recently, bilateral and multilateral relations have intensified between the five Central Asian republics and the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In addition to a surge in diplomatic visits and meetings at the state level, there are also signs of increasing GCC investment plans in Central Asia. This is accompanied by growing people-to-people and business  contacts; operators report a rise in travel between the two regions, while experts highlight the GCC as a potential labour migration destination for Central Asian workers.

Against the backdrop of a seemingly encouraging overall picture, it is also important to consider development assistance. In Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are upper middle-income countries, with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan being lower middle-income countries. The latter three Central Asian republics receive development assistance to a larger extent, while Kazakhstan has started developing its own development agency. Nonetheless, all five countries remain assistance recipients.

Traditional development assistance providers are based in the Global North, particularly among Western states. As such, many of the world’s leading development actors, such as the United Kingdom and France, are also former colonial powers. This often raises debates on how to approach aid and ensure historical injustices are addressed. So-called ‘new development assistance’ includes recently emerged major economic powers, who have received development aid themselves in the past, including China, India, and Brazil, among others.

The GCC states thus represent an emerging wave of development assistance providers, having only recently begun to establish their profiles as global development donors. Central Asia, on the other hand, offers opportunities to engage in development aid in a politically safe and transparent manner. Having long been a recipient of development assistance, Central Asia still requires external support but has also accumulated sufficient knowledge and experience to engage with donors efficiently and transparently.

The United Nations recommends developed nations to allocate 0.7 percent of their gross national income (GNI) to development assistance. The leading development assistance providers in the GCC—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates—collectively contributed $9.2 billion in development aid in 2022 alone, concretising the region’s role in global development. Moreover, these states have established formal aid agencies and report significant outbound assistance

At the regional level, the GCC states have contributed to multilateral organisations such as the Islamic Development Bank, where they are major stakeholders. These efforts are often announced at GCC summits or ministerial meetings, with funding decisions aligning their collective strategic priorities. According to a 2023 report by the Center for International Policy Research, in 2021, the UAE provided $47.2 million in development aid to Central Asia, while Qatar allocated $5.2 million. Saudi Arabia contributed $43.6 million, and Kuwait distributed $33.3 million in further development assistance to the region.

Inter-regional multilateral relations are becoming increasingly substantial and regular. The inaugural GCC-Central Asia Summit took place in the Saudi city of Jeddah on July 19, 2023. The next summit is scheduled to be held in May 2025 in the Uzbek city of Samarkand. In between these two milestone meetings, there have been a series of ministerial meetings, where cooperation in trade, economic, investment, transport and communications, cultural, humanitarian, environmental, and tourism sectors were discussed.

However, there remains a gap in the regional landscape in climate finance in Central Asia that must be addressed. The Trump administration’s recent suspension of all foreign aid sent shockwaves across the global development sector, sparking confusion and panic. While the full impact of this decision is yet to be realised and analysed, it is clear that at least some areas of economic development and welfare worldwide—including Central Asia—will require additional support.

In addition, the GCC states, alongside other development donors, have a unique opportunity to carry out a conceptual overhaul of the global development aid approach. Conventional development assistance has faced significant criticism, ranging from neocolonial allegations to concerns about inefficiency. The GCC has both the resources and the strategic positioning to create something new, innovative, and more effective. Entering Central Asia as a relatively neutral actor, the GCC is unburdened by a complicated shared past, unlike Russia, or politically motivated aid, as seen with the EU or the US. This neutrality could help facilitate a mutually beneficial and more equitable partnership between the two regions.

Engaging in development assistance in Central Asia provides the GCC with an opportunity to boost its soft power in the region. There are numerous avenues for bilateral and multilateral cooperation to choose from, including, but not limited to, public healthcare, education, tourism, and poverty alleviation.

However, two key challenges may impede smooth development cooperation between the GCC and Central Asia. First, the GCC lacks a designated agency focused on multilateral development cooperation and the pooling available funds to support developing countries. In contrast to certain nations and other international entities that have separate organisations—such as USAID or EU AID—there is no specific GCC development assistance agency with a distinct name and brand. Branding is crucial in international development, particularly for visibility and public support on the ground. Development assistance serves various objectives, one of which is to build a positive image of the donor, thereby strengthening its soft power on both global and local levels.

The closest equivalent to a dedicated development agency within the GCC is the coordinated effort under the GCC Secretariat General, often linked to initiatives like the Gulf Programme for Development (AGFUND). However, the execution of these efforts is largely delegated to national entities like the Saudi Fund for Development or Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development. National institutions within the GCC’s member states occasionally collaborate in distributing development assistance and work with regional mechanisms or funds set up under the GCC’s guidance.

Second, there is a clear lack of in-depth knowledge and understanding of the local and regional context in Central Asia, as well as the specific needs on the ground. It is no secret that, until recently, the GCC-CA interaction has been fairly limited; both regions have prioritised closer partnerships elsewhere in the world. However, the high-level GCC-C5 Summit in 2023 and the upcoming Summit in Samarkand this year signal a growing commitment from both sides to deepen ties.

Policymakers in the GCC might consider streamlining regional development assistance, channelling it through intra-regional cooperation paths. This approach will help donor coordination, on one hand, and increase the visibility and impact of development assistance on the other. Meanwhile, policymakers in Central Asia could prepare and pitch ready-made proposals on how external national donors might contribute to the region’s economic development and welfare. Clear and transparent requests would make it easier for willing donors to justify their contributions domestically and internationally, creating the space for growth within this delicate dynamic.

While there is limited recent history of deep and meaningful interaction between the GCC nations and the Central Asian republics, the future of inter-regional cooperation appears cautiously bright. As the conventional development partners, such as the US and the EU, either withdraw completely from the international development sector or turn their focus to regions like Ukraine, the GCC countries are emerging as the new key actors in development assistance.

At this stage, Central Asia has accumulated notable experience and expertise in engaging with development cooperation. Countries like Kazakhstan are on the verge of a transition from being recipients of development assistance to becoming providers themselves. But the majority of the region still requires external support, especially in the areas of economic development and transition to renewable energy. In light of this, the GCC could become a much more powerful player in this field.

The article was published by the Bourse & Bazaar Foundation at https://www.bourseandbazaar.org/articles/2025/3/10/gulf-states-offer-development-assistance-in-central-asia-as-western-donors-step-back.

The post Bridging regions: Central Asia and the Gulf States deepen cooperation first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

On March 13, 2025, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan marked a potentially historic day in Central Asia with the signing of an agreement to resolve their decades-long border dispute. Presidents Sadyr Japarov and Emomali Rahmon met in Bishkek to formalize a deal that not only delineated their shared frontier but also symbolically closed the final chapter of unresolved territorial disputes in the region. This moment carries profound weight: with this agreement, Central Asian states have, at last, achieved the status of full-fledged nations with mutually recognized borders. Yet, while the signing represents a monumental diplomatic triumph, its true significance hinges on whether the governments can meet the towering expectations it has set.

The agreement’s single greatest promise is peace. For much of the post-Soviet era since 1991, life along the Kyrgyz-Tajik border was largely tranquil, and peace, not conflict, was the norm. However, this harmony was shattered by escalating tensions, culminating in deadly border clashes in 2021 and 2022. Now, with both sides reaching a shared understanding of the status quo, the agreement promises a return to that earlier norm of peaceful coexistence.

Beyond peace, the deal promises tangible improvements for the people of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The border closures have stifled trade and tourism, choking economic opportunities and isolating communities. Markets that once thrived on cross-border exchange may flourish again, while families separated by political lines could reconnect. This economic and social revival is not just a practical outcome—it’s a lifeline for border regions long trapped in limbo.

Regionally, the accord contributes to Central Asia’s aspirations for greater regional cooperation. Two nations with a closed border stood as a glaring contradiction to the growing rhetoric of regional unity. As the geopolitical order at the global level feels in freefall, the border agreement comes at a crucial moment to demonstrate that there is a cohesive Central Asia. On the ground, the deal could inspire further collaboration, from joint infrastructure projects to coordinated responses to shared challenges like climate change, provided the momentum is sustained.

The diplomatic heavy lifting may be complete, but implementing the agreement is a task no less daunting. The two governments will now have to rally domestic public support behind the agreement, addressing possible skepticism and disagreement with grace and determination. Demarcating the border on the ground—translating lines on a map into reality—will test administrative capacity and political will. The joint use of shared resources like water and roads remains a potential flashpoint. These are the lifeblood of border communities and must be managed with the utmost care.

Domestic politics and economic pressures add further complexity. In border areas, where livelihoods have been disrupted by conflict, vested interests might emerge to exploit lingering grievances, potentially reigniting tensions. The events of 2021 and 2022 have layered a new history of mistrust atop a longer legacy of coexistence, complicating efforts to restore confidence. Rebuilding trust among border populations will require sustained commitment to prevent even minor incidents from spiraling out of control.

What, then, is needed to ensure this agreement fulfills its promise? The high-profile signing ceremony was a strong start, projecting resolve and unity. There is a strong public consensus on the primacy of peace that the agreement promises over the perceived fairness of the deal. But the governments should not take this for granted and must make every effort to communicate the details of the agreement in a transparent manner. Equally critical is an unequivocal commitment to de-escalation: both sides must explicitly rule out the use of firearms in response to any future incidents, signaling that peace is non-negotiable.

March 13, 2025, could indeed go down as a historic day for Central Asia. Surely, history will judge this moment not by the ink on the page, but by the actions that follow. The stakes are high, the expectations higher still. Hopefully, through diligence, dialogue, and determination, the two sides can build on the impressive work done so far and turn this triumphant moment into a lasting legacy.

The post A line drawn for peace: Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’s historic step forward first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

The inauguration of a new U.S. president in January 2025 has triggered a geopolitical shift, felt keenly in Central Asia. Policy changes enacted by President Trump remain a moving target for analysts, but their impact on the region will likely have two manifestations: first, America’s relations with Central Asia’s major partners—Russia, China, and the European Union; and second, a recalibration of the “interests vs. values” dichotomy in U.S. foreign policy. Overall, while the ‘quiet death’ of democracy promotion brings relief to Central Asian leaders, they will likely face more of the “hard power” realities of international politics.

Indirect Impact: U.S. Relations with Central Asia’s Partners

The U.S.’s influence on Central Asia mostly depends on how it engages the region’s other partners. A potential thaw in U.S.-Russia relations—hinted at in Riyadh talks and discussions of sanction relief—could recalibrate Moscow’s stance in the region. Russia’s leverage, somewhat weakened by the Ukraine conflict, might regain strength if tensions with the West subside, prompting Central Asian states to tread even more carefully around Kremlin sensitivities.

Meanwhile, China continues deepening its economic grip through the Belt and Road Initiative, binding Central Asian economies to Beijing’s orbit. The U.S., determined to counterbalance China, may offer trade or investment incentives, particularly in critical mineral resources. However, Washington’s strategic distractions will likely allow China to entrench its economic influence further.

The European Union, struggling to reinvent itself as a geopolitical power amid U.S. alliance strains and Russia’s assertiveness, will likely adopt an even more pragmatic approach in its Central Asia relations. Yet Washington’s weakening transatlantic ties could diminish Europe’s sway in Central Asia. Regional leaders, ever pragmatic, will adjust their alignments accordingly, leveraging these evolving dynamics to their advantage.

Done with Democracy

The new U.S. administration’s full-scale retreat from democracy promotion removes a longstanding point of friction with Central Asian governments. Once a staple of Washington’s engagement, democracy advocacy has faded in favor of a stability-first approach. The result so far has been fewer lectures, but it remains to be seen if it leads to more handshakes.

This shift will likely weaken not only U.S. pressure on governance issues but also the European Union’s commitment to democracy and human rights in the region. Without strong transatlantic backing, European policies in these areas may become more pragmatic, further reducing external leverage on governance reforms.

This trend has already created challenges for civil society and independent media in the region. With less external support, they may face greater pressure from domestic authorities. However, the need for self-reliance could also strengthen their legitimacy, fostering deeper local roots and resilience. In the long run, this may push civil society actors to find new ways to sustain their work and engage with domestic audiences on their own terms. Meanwhile, free from ideological scrutiny, regional governments will continue prioritizing sovereignty and stability in their dealings with Washington and Brussels.

Critical Minerals and Strategic Partnerships

This pragmatic turn renews the U.S. focus on Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Central Asia’s economic and geopolitical linchpins. Kazakhstan’s vast reserves of critical minerals—essential for global supply chains—strengthen its strategic value to Washington. With its large population and ongoing reforms, Uzbekistan offers an appealing partner for trade, security cooperation, and investment.

The oft-cited C5+1 framework may remain a platform to bring the U.S.  and all five Central Asian states together but will likely lose relevance, with actual engagement happening on bilateral basis. Washington prioritizes tangible gains—access to mineral wealth of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan—while smaller players like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan may find themselves further in the margins. Turkmenistan, with its energy resources, remains an exception, maintaining relevance despite its isolationist tendencies.

Overall, for Central Asia, the new U.S. presidency signals not disruption but recalibration. Russia’s evolving posture, China’s economic dominance, and Europe’s limited engagement set the broader context. The end of democracy promotion removes an irritant, while U.S. pragmatism cements Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as focal points. As ever, regional leaders will continue to balance major powers, seize strategic openings, and maintain flexibility in an increasingly multipolar order.

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The post Trump’s return: what’s in store for Central Asia? first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

Aijan Sharshenova, PhD, Executive Director at Crossroads Central Asia and a Leading Researcher at the Populist Encounters research group at Riga Stradins University

Climate change poses a significant challenge for Central Asia, and the Kyrgyz Republic is no exception. As global efforts to curb greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions intensify, carbon pricing has emerged as a key instrument for climate mitigation. By assigning a financial cost to carbon emissions, carbon pricing creates economic incentives for businesses and consumers to adopt cleaner energy sources and improve efficiency.

This report examines the opportunities and challenges of introducing carbon pricing in Kyrgyzstan, assessing two main approaches: carbon taxes and emissions trading schemes (ETS). While both mechanisms have been successfully implemented in different countries, their suitability depends on Kyrgyzstan’s economic structure, administrative capacity, and regulatory framework. Supported by a research grant from the CAREC Institute, the study was conducted by Rahat Sabyrbekov and Aijan Sharshenova from Crossroads Central Asia.

Regional Context: Where Does Kyrgyzstan Stand?

Several Central Asian countries have taken steps toward carbon pricing:

• Kazakhstan introduced an ETS in 2013, modeled after the European Union’s system.
• Uzbekistan has launched carbon credit trading initiatives, supported by international partners.
• Kyrgyzstan, despite its ambitious climate commitments, has no structured carbon pricing policy, and lacks the necessary legal and administrative mechanisms to implement one.

Key Findings from the Study

The report identifies several critical insights regarding the feasibility of carbon pricing in Kyrgyzstan:

1. High-Emission Sectors: The energy supply, trade, manufacturing, and mining sectors are the largest contributors to CO₂ emissions. Addressing emissions in these industries will be crucial for any carbon pricing mechanism to succeed.
2. Economic Impact: If a carbon price of $50 per ton of CO₂ were implemented, the total carbon cost across all sectors would exceed $560 million annually, creating both financial risks and revenue opportunities.
3. Policy and Administrative Readiness: The government, private sector, and civil society are not yet fully prepared for carbon pricing. Key barriers include lack of technical capacity, legal frameworks, and stakeholder engagement.
4. Stakeholder Perspectives: While government officials recognize the importance of carbon pricing, they emphasize the need for international technical and financial support to ensure effective implementation.
5. Public Awareness and Business Readiness: Many businesses and consumers lack awareness of carbon pricing and may resist new policies unless they are accompanied by clear communication, incentives, and support mechanisms.

Choosing the Right Approach: ETS vs. Carbon Tax

The study evaluates two possible scenarios for Kyrgyzstan:

1. Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS)

• Allows businesses to trade emission permits, creating flexibility.
• Requires complex monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) systems.
• Less feasible due to Kyrgyzstan’s small industrial base and limited private sector engagement.

2. Carbon Tax (Recommended Approach)

• Easier to implement using existing tax structures.
• Could generate up to $288 million annually, which can be reinvested in clean energy and social programs.
• Can be gradually introduced, focusing on high-emission sectors first.
• Requires strong revenue allocation policies to ensure fairness and effectiveness.

Policy Recommendations

• For a successful transition to carbon pricing, the study recommends:
• Developing a clear legal and administrative framework to support implementation.
• Starting with a pilot carbon tax in key sectors (e.g., mining and trade).
• Ensuring carbon tax revenues are reinvested in renewable energy and social protection programs.
• Engaging stakeholders across government, business, and civil society to build trust and awareness.
• Seeking international financial and technical support to bridge gaps in expertise and infrastructure.

Conclusions

Carbon pricing presents a significant opportunity for Kyrgyzstan to combat climate change while supporting economic sustainability. By assigning a financial cost to emissions, it creates incentives for cleaner energy use and efficiency improvements. After analyzing two primary options—ETS and Carbon Tax—this study finds that a carbon tax is the most practical and effective solution for Kyrgyzstan. If properly designed, a carbon tax could reduce emissions, generate sustainable revenue, and drive investment in cleaner technologies. However, success will depend on careful implementation, strong governance, and well-structured revenue allocation to prevent disproportionate economic impacts on businesses and consumers.

Despite its potential benefits, implementing carbon pricing in Kyrgyzstan poses challenges. The lack of existing legal frameworks, administrative capacity, and public awareness could slow adoption. Additionally, industries and consumers may resist carbon pricing if they perceive it as an additional financial burden without clear benefits. Learning from Kazakhstan’s ETS experience and Uzbekistan’s carbon credit initiatives could provide valuable insights for designing a policy that is both effective and politically feasible. International collaboration and donor support will be crucial in providing technical expertise, capacity-building programs, and financial resources to facilitate implementation.

With strong government leadership, stakeholder engagement, and strategic planning, carbon pricing can become a powerful tool for environmental and economic progress in Kyrgyzstan. By integrating it into the country’s broader development and energy transition strategies, the Kyrgyz Republic can reduce emissions, enhance investment in sustainable technologies, and position itself as a regional leader in climate action. Implementing a well-structured carbon pricing mechanism will not only support Kyrgyzstan’s commitments under the Paris Agreement but also contribute to a cleaner, more resilient, and economically sustainable future.

Download the full report here.

This study was funded by a research grant from the CAREC Think Tank Network (CTTN). The original report was published on the CAREC Institute website at:
https://www.carecinstitute.org/publications/exploring-carbon-pricing-in-central-asia-new-insights-from-the-kyrgyz-republic/

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Dr Sharshenova highlighted several critical obstacles that Central Asian countries must address to achieve better regional integration. She pointed out that the region’s historical path dependency, shaped by decades of governance from Moscow during the Soviet era, has contributed to a reliance on external decision-making. This legacy has made it challenging for Central Asian nations to fully assume responsibility for resolving regional issues and fostering dialogue among themselves.

One major obstacle is the presence of unresolved border disputes, which continue to strain relations between neighboring countries. Additionally, the region’s geopolitical and economic diversity presents significant challenges. Central Asia is home to five nations with varying economic capacities and geopolitical alignments. For instance, some countries, such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, are resource-rich and economically stronger, while others, like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, face more economic constraints. Furthermore, the region’s proximity to major powers like Russia and China adds complexity to its integration efforts, as these external actors exert considerable influence over local policies.

Dr. Sharshenova also emphasized the differing interests of upstream and downstream countries in managing shared water resources. Upstream nations with abundant water resources demand recognition of water as a commodity that should be compensated for, while downstream nations depend on these resources for their survival. Such disputes hinder the development of cooperative frameworks for regional water management and energy integration.

Despite these challenges, Dr. Sharshenova noted growing opportunities for integration. Over the past 30 years, Central Asian countries have developed a shared identity rooted in their common history and interests. There is increasing political will to strengthen regional cooperation, but progress remains uneven due to the dynamic and shifting nature of domestic and international conditions. To move forward, she suggested that the region must capitalize on moments when geopolitical conditions are favorable, balancing external partnerships pragmatically and fostering trust through shared economic and cultural initiatives.

The interview can be accessed at Hollings Center for International Dialogue at https://hollingscenter.org/central-asias-path-to-regional-cooperation/.

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Dr. Dzhuraev’s remarks focused on two questions: the key trends shaping international relations in Central Asia and the relevance of the OTS in navigating these dynamics. He pointed to three developments have been shaping the region’s international engagement. First, geopolitical tensions are intensifying, fueled by the war in Ukraine and Central Asia’s proximity to Russia, a power whose influence looms large over the region. Second, the demand for alternative land-based transport corridors is rising. This shift, driven by the Ukraine conflict, China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and pandemic-induced disruptions to global supply chains, underscores Central Asia’s emerging role in transcontinental connectivity. Finally, intra-regional cooperation has been gradually, if cautiously, improving since 2016.

Against this backdrop, Dr. Dzhuraev positioned the OTS as an increasingly vital institution in three ways. Foremost, it serves as a platform to bolster regional integration. While Central Asia has historically grappled with uneven cooperation, the OTS adds a fresh dimension to existing multilateral mechanisms, such as the SCO, CSTO, and C5+1 formats. By introducing new priorities and participants to the conversation, the OTS both reflects and reinforces a growing appetite for collaboration within the region.

Equally important, Dr. Dzhuraev argued, is the OTS’s potential to elevate Central Asia as a bridge between East and West. For decades, the region has been dismissed as a remote and landlocked backwater. Yet, with the proliferation of transcontinental trade routes, this narrative is being rewritten. The OTS is uniquely positioned to capitalize on this momentum, fostering economic partnerships in trade and transport. Azerbaijan, in particular, was singled out as pivotal to this transformation.

Finally, the OTS exemplifies Central Asia’s embrace of a multi-vector foreign policy. Despite narratives to the contrary, many major powers view their interests in the region through a zero-sum lens. In this context, the OTS serves as a manifestation of Central Asia’s desire to maintain diverse and mutually inclusive relationships with the world. Thus, for Dr. Dzhuraev, the OTS is not just a tool for political, cultural, or economic integration but also a vehicle for advancing the region’s broader geopolitical ambitions.

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From September 15-17, 2024, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz travelled to Central Asia, making official visits to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan before attending the second summit of the C5+1 format, where he met with all five Central Asian leaders. Chancellor Scholz’s packed itinerary came as a timely reminder of the significant uptick in Central Asia’s international relations in recent years.

Traditionally viewed as a peripheral region, Central Asia is now navigating an increasingly intricate geopolitical environment. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reshaped the region’s international agenda, revealing new risks and opportunities. Increasing tension between the West and China adds further nuance to Central Asia’s relations with its major external partners.

The central question this article addresses is how the shifting geopolitical landscape is affecting Central Asia’s international agency and how sustainable its impact is. As military and economic confrontations among major powers intensify, Central Asia appears to be attracting increasing international attention. These developments coincided with a rise in regional cooperation, suggesting a potential new phase in the region’s international relations.

The paper argues that while the current geopolitical context creates favourable conditions for Central Asia to enhance its international actorness, expectations need to be tempered. Key drivers of geopolitical shifts lie outside the region and, thus, are at the whim of external powers. Additionally, although regional cooperation within Central Asia shows promise compared to previous years, it has yet to deliver tangible progress. The paper proceeds by first outlining the changing geopolitical context, then exploring the region’s evolving cooperation efforts and finally assessing the track record of regional cooperation.

The context: the return of geopolitics

For much of the post-Soviet period, Central Asia remained on the periphery of global international affairs. In the 1990s, the West’s priority was stable relations with Russia, particularly under Boris Yeltsin’s leadership. Central Asia was mostly seen as Russia’s backyard. In the late 1990s, as tensions between Russia and the West gradually surfaced, analysts viewed Central Asia as a theatre for broader geopolitical confrontation or part of the “grand chessboard,” reflecting the perception that the region lacked significant international agency.

However, several developments in recent years have shifted Central Asia’s international relations and position in global geopolitics. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, followed by its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, sent shockwaves throughout the post-Soviet space, particularly in Central Asia. Sharing long land borders with Russia, Central Asian states, and particularly Kazakhstan, interpreted Russia’s actions in Ukraine as Moscow’s disregard for international law and the principle of state sovereignty. In other words, the region had to confront the possibility that Russia could challenge the post-1991 borders. In such a context, the broad international condemnation of Russia’s aggression, followed by Western sanctions against Russia, presented both a challenge and an opportunity for Central Asia. Given its political and economic ties—and, above all, its geography—Central Asia has no alternative but to carefully balance maintaining amicable relations with Russia while keeping a safe distance from it.

The growing tension between the West and China further complicated Central Asia’s geopolitical context. While China has long been recognised as a rising global power, its presence has grown significantly in Central Asia in the past two decades. Today, China is a key trade partner, an active member of multilateral interstate institutions, and one of the region’s largest investors and lenders. As US-Chinese (and less drastically EU-Chinese relations) deteriorated, Central Asia found itself in a not-so-peripheral situation, facing both pressures and incentives from both sides. To complete the triangle, Russia’s increasing dependence on China due to sanctions and diplomatic isolation made Moscow more amenable to Beijing’s expanding presence in Central Asia. Thus, the broader geopolitical developments have been dynamic, presenting a testing moment for Central Asia’s ability to assert its international agency.

Is Central Asia gaining an agency?

What has been the impact of increasingly unstable geopolitical developments on Central Asia’s international relations? While the question is a moving target, there is no shortage of analyses on the subject. At one end is a view that Central Asia finds itself cornered by competing demands from its influential external partners. Thus, Uzbekistan’s president recently said that Central Asian states have turned into “hostages of the sanctions policy”, citing growing logistics costs and inflationary pressures.[1] At the other end are the arguments of Central Asia acquiring a greater international agency, well captured by a recent commentary aptly titled “Nobody’s Backyard: A Confident Central Asia”.[2]A brief review of Central Asia’s relations with key extra-regional powers illustrates the dynamics.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine did not sit well with Central Asia.

The countries of the region have limited sympathy for Russia’s claims about threats from NATO or the presence of Nazism in Ukraine. What they see is rather another former Soviet republic, after Georgia in 2008, attacked by Russia. Reflecting this, Central Asia took a surprisingly bold stance on the events. While never criticising Russia, Central Asians refrained from endorsing Moscow’s justifications. Notably, the leadership of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan publicly refused to recognise the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk.

Mindful of its diminishing legitimacy in Central Asia (and globally), Russia is playing hard to reverse the trend. After a brief period of relative restraint in the months after the invasion, Russia has intensified its attempts to pull Central Asian states, at least discursively, into its confrontation with the West. Illustrative was a recent statement from a Russian foreign minister who confided his Central Asian colleagues expressed their outrage about the “unceremoniousness and outright impudence” of the West.[3] Russia also revived efforts to solidify its Central Asia diplomatic and economic connections. Thus, in 2023, Russia followed suit from other powers and held its first C5+1 summit. It also doubled down on bilateral relations, with the start of Russian gas export to Uzbekistan in October 2023 a major highlight.

In contrast to Russia, China’s presence in Central Asia has steadily benefited from the war in Ukraine. Beijing solidified its status as Moscow’s strategic partner, as two countries shared distaste for the Western dominance. Facing sanctions and broad diplomatic pressure, Russia would now pose less obstruction to China’s expansion in Central Asia. Evidence to this was a revival of China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railroad, a project that remained frozen since late 1990s, not least due to Russia’s objections.[4] At the same time, China’s response to Russia’s aggression was “less than enthusiastic.”[5], which made it a crucial ally to Central Asia, also lacking keen not to show enthusiasm.

The West’s engagement with Central Asia has transformed markedly in recent years. In the 1990s, Western involvement focused on supporting democratisation and providing development aid. Following 9/11, Central Asia turned into a strategic partner in NATO’s war on terror in Afghanistan. Following a brief “lull period” after the withdrawal of the US airbase from Kyrgyzstan in 2014, the Western countries’ engagement with Central Asia has been on the rise recently. The US’s engagement appears to broadly respect Rumer’s recommendations: de-emphasising democracy promotion, focusing more on Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and prioritising concerns about China’s growing influence. In recent years, the US and EU held a series of C5+1 ministerial meetings, culminating in the US President Biden’s summit with five Central Asian counterparts in September 2023. Much to the relief of Central Asian leaders, their meetings with American and European colleagues now mostly focus on connectivity, supply chains, climate or critical minerals rather than the rule of law or freedom of media.

Beyond the above major powers, Central Asian leaders also find themselves in increasing diplomatic engagement with a host of other actors, including Turkey, Germany, UK, France, India and others. Combined, these developments pushed observers to claim Central Asia was no more a chessboard.[6] Moreover, the proliferation of C5+1 appears to have contributed to a concurrent process of growing regional cooperation, creating additional platforms for five leaders to meet and talk – an element notably lacking in the past. This brings us to the next section, which reviews how regional cooperation has evolved in the context of turbulent geopolitics.

A new phase in regional cooperation?

When attributed to a five-country region, a notion of international “agency” presumes the ability of individual country leaders to define and promote the interests of the region as a whole. Therefore, a timely question is how regional cooperation dynamics uphold the expectations of the region’s growing agency.

Historically, Central Asia had a troubled history of regional cooperation efforts. Throughout the 1990s, the region saw multiple attempts to establish cooperation platforms, but most failed. The last one, the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO), was disbanded in 2005 in favour of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC). The event, which Russian President Putin commented was “the best birthday present from colleagues”, signalled Central Asian states accepted the preeminence of a Russia-led platform over a purely indigenous one. In 2008, Uzbekistan’s leader bluntly ruled out the possibility of a regional union, saying the countries of the region did not have capacities and policies of sufficiently comparable nature for such a task. Indeed, disagreements over transboundary water resources, transport networks, and border delimitation proved the region had a full plate of divisive policy issues.

A major change occurred in 2016 with the political leadership transition in Uzbekistan, the centrally located and most populous country of the region. As a sign of the country turning from a spoiler to a driver of regional cooperation, the new Uzbek leader proposed annual consultative meetings with Central Asian leaders. The format was relatively modest, both to avoid unnerving Russia and to ensure buy-in from the countries of the region, including the traditionally neutral Turkmenistan. The idea has thus far proven workable, evidenced by the 6th meeting hosted in Astana in August 2024.

Alongside the regional level, Central Asian states are also demonstrating improving bilateral relations, albeit with important reservations. Since 2016, Uzbekistan succeeded in resolving outstanding border delimitation issues with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. A result was the re-opening of the border crossing, which was crucial for the densely populated Fergana Valley population. Furthermore, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan signed the Allied Relations Treaty, which testified to “the highest and most trusting level of interstate partnership”, according to the Uzbek president. In 2024, similar treaties were signed between Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.[7]

Thus, in recent years, Central Asia saw an uptick in cooperative relations in a region. This is a notable departure from past dynamics, suggesting a renewed willingness among Central Asian nations to collaborate more closely. Hypothetically, this trend would contribute to the emergence of a consolidated regional voice on the international stage. However, significant challenges remain, and expectations should be approached with caution.

Challenges ahead

If Central Asia’s regional initiatives and engagement with non-regional powers suggest its growing international agency, how sustainable is the trend? The question is very much dependent on the definition of “agency”. Most commentaries discuss the term based on the notion of international attention that Central Asia is suddenly receiving, with the flurry of C5+1 summits as an illustration. However, the perceived “importance” that such attention may indicate is insufficient to convey the notion of agency. The agency is about how independent Central Asia is in formulating and acting on its policies. As American expert Robert Daly suggested, Central Asia’s agency implies that the region is able to say “no” to any of Russia, the US, or China.^[8] Second, when applied to a region of five independent countries, agency should also imply a degree of “integratedness”, i.e., an ability of five countries to act as one rather than five actors. Against these criteria, Central Asia appears to yet to convince.

First, the optimism surrounding the region’s growing “agency” is largely driven by external dynamics, not internal. The heightened interest from major powers stems from shifts in relations among the United States, China, and Russia. This does not negate the growing importance of Central Asia, yet it suggests such importance is due to dynamics outside Central Asia’s control. During the U.S.-led war on terror in Afghanistan, Central Asia gained prominence as a strategic partner for NATO. However, such prominence waned in the early 2010s when the US lost its interest in Afghanistan. Therefore, Central Asia’s agency should be assessed not based on the “attention” it is getting from actors around the world but on the response that Central Asia is able to formulate and push forward. If Central Asia finds itself mostly nodding in high-level summits, its agency may be yet to be experienced.

Second, Central Asia’s track record of performing as a cohesive “actor” remains uncertain. While regional cooperation has undeniably improved since 2016, the bar for progress was set quite low. After six years of annual consultative meetings among Central Asian leaders, the platform has yet to produce a significant outcome. In the 2024 meeting, Turkmen president openly ruled out possible institutionalisation, saying he sees the summit should remain of consultative nature and “without strictly regulating rules and procedures”.

Moreover, in the 2022 summit, the region’s leaders discussed the “Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness, and Cooperation for Development of Central Asia in the 21st Century.” However, only three signed. Tajikistan and Turkmenistan refused to do that, citing doubtful justification – the need to “complete domestic procedures”. Furthermore, two countries of the region, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, went through violent border clashes in 2021 and 2022. Seen from the Kyrgyz-Tajik border, which remains completely closed today, Central Asia’s regional cooperation and growing agency appear fragile at best.

Conclusion

Central Asia is at a crossroads, with shifting geopolitical dynamics offering both opportunities and challenges for the region to assert itself as a coherent international actor. The weakening of Russia’s traditional dominance, China’s expanding influence, and the rediscovered pragmatism of Western engagement have collectively created a landscape where Central Asian states can potentially enhance their agency and deepen regional cooperation.

However, this optimism must be tempered by the realities on the ground. The region’s heightened international profile is largely a byproduct of external power dynamics rather than intrinsic regional unity. In such circumstances, a region’s significance can wane as quickly as it rises, contingent on the strategic interests of major powers. Internal challenges such as bilateral border disputes further complicate the picture.

In light of the above challenges, Central Asian countries face the critical task of translating diplomatic rhetoric into tangible results. The path forward requires genuine collaboration, not just among Central Asian states but also in their engagements with non-regional powers, to ensure that regional agency is driven internally and not as a byproduct of external circumstances.

This article was originally written for Global Perspectives, a newsletter of the Hanns Seidel Foundation, and was published on 22 October 2024 at https://europe.hss.de/en/news-2/detail/central-asia-in-a-shifting-geopolitical-landscape-news12186/.

Notes

^[1] “We have become prisoners of the policy of sanctions” – President of Uzbekistan (2024): URL: daryo.uz/en/2024/08/09/we-have-become-prisoners-of-the-policy-of-sanctions-president-of-uzbekistan [Accessed 23.09.2024].

^[2] Murtazashvili, Jennifer B., and Temur Umarov (2024): Nobody’s Backyard: A Confident Central Asia, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. URL: carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/09/nobodys-backyard-a-confident-central-asia [Accessed 23.09.2024].

^[3] “Sergey Lavrov: The West is Trying to Subjugate Central Asian Countries” (2024): 24.kg. URL: 24.kg/vlast/294608_sergey_lavrov_zapad_pyitaetsya_podmyat_pod_sebya_stranyi_tsentralnoy_azii/ [Accessed 23.09.2024].

^[4] “President Japarov Tells About Construction of Railway” (2022): 24.kg. URL: 24.kg/english/235254_President_Japarov_tells_about_construction_of_railway/ [Accessed 23.09.2024].

^[5] Pomfret, Richard (2022): Russia’s Setback in Samarkand, East Asia Forum. URL: eastasiaforum.org/2022/10/17/russias-setback-in-samarkand/ [Accessed 23.09.2024].

^[6] Cornell, Svante E., and S. Frederick Starr (2015): Chessboard No More: The Rise of Central Asia’s International Agency, Caucasus Analyst. URL: www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13773-chessboard-no-more-the-rise-of-central-asia%E2%80%99s-international-agency.html [Accessed 23.09.2024].

^[7] Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan signed such a treaty back in 2003.

^[8] Muratalieva, Nargiza (2022): Central Asia in the Context of US-China Confrontation: An Interview with Robert Daly, CABAR.asia. URL: https://cabar.asia/en/central-asia-in-the-context-of-us-china-confrontation-an-interview-with-robert-daly [Accessed 23.09.2024].

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