Eva Morgan is a Research Assistant at Crossroads Central Asia. She is pursuing a BA in Arabic and Russian at the University of Oxford.
The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 and the rapid consolidation of power by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) marked one of the most consequential political shifts in the Middle East in over a decade. While regional and global actors, most prominently Turkey, Gulf states, the United States, Russia, and Ukraine, moved quickly to position themselves vis-à-vis the new authorities in Damascus, one group of states stood out for their restraint: the countries of Central Asia.
More than a year after Assad’s departure, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have largely avoided formal statements, bilateral initiatives, or clear diplomatic signalling toward the new Syrian government. This silence is striking not only because of Syria’s renewed geopolitical relevance, but also because developments in the Middle East often intersect indirectly with Central Asia’s own security and foreign-policy considerations.
This article argues that Central Asia’s muted response is not the result of indecision or neglect, but a deliberate and calculated strategy. At its core lies the uncomfortable positioning of post-Assad Syria within the broader Russia–Ukraine confrontation. As Moscow and Kyiv compete, both directly and symbolically, for influence in Damascus, any overt engagement with the new Syrian authorities risks being interpreted as a geopolitical alignment. For Central Asian states that remain economically and politically entangled with Russia, strategic silence – much like their approach to the Russia-Ukraine war itself – has emerged as the least costly option.
By examining how Russian and Ukrainian involvement in Syria has shaped Central Asian calculations, this article discusses the logic behind this restraint, the differences in approach among Central Asian states, and the conditions under which silence may eventually give way to cautious engagement.
PATTERNS OF CAUTION IN CENTRAL ASIAN RESPONSES
Public engagement between Central Asian governments and the new Syrian authorities has so far been minimal, confined to large international conferences. However, Central Asian ministers sharing a room with new Syrian officials has not always resulted in public interaction. The search “Syria” on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan’s website is blank. Tajikistan’s last formal interaction was on September 26, 2024 during the 79th session of the UN General Assembly. In Kyrgyzstan’s case, the most recent entry on its MFA’s website mentioning Syria, published on December 10, 2024, focuses on the 22nd Doha International Forum held on December 7-8, 2024. Despite the regime change unfolding on December 8, 2024, during the conference, the summary lists Syria only midway in a series of conflicts, an avoidant formulation that chooses to ignore Assad’s flight to Moscow on that very day.
In contrast to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have made limited public references to Syria since December 2024. The 51st Session of the OIC Ministerial Council was the vehicle used by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for discussions with Syria outside of official bilateral diplomatic meetings, which would require a formal acknowledgement of regime change. Baxtiyor Saidov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Uzbekistan, held talks on the side of the session with Foreign Minister of Syria Asaad Hassan Al-Shaibani, during which “prospects for close cooperation were discussed”. Kazakhstan’s then Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu similarly participated in the session and mentioned the necessary “stabilization of the situation in Syria” and “taking into account the interests of the Syrian people”.
Read full paper (PDF)This report is part of Crossroads Central Asia’s series highlighting analytical work by emerging scholars working on the region.