The event brought together European policymakers, researchers, and media practitioners to examine FIMI dynamics in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. It was opened by Irène Mingasson, Head of Unit at the European Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments.

The study — conducted by ENC the EU-funded CARAVAN project of Internews, with Dr. Juraev as lead researcher — draws on AI-assisted analysis of over 581,000 social media posts alongside expert interviews and regional consultations.

The findings contribute to ongoing European policy discussions on countering FIMI by providing region-specific evidence on narrative patterns, amplification dynamics, and structural vulnerabilities in the information environment. The study underscores that effective responses must be country-specific, as conditions and intervention strategies differ significantly between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

The post Dr. Shairbek Juraev presents FIMI research in Brussels first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

Astana hosted over 1,500 delegates, five heads of state, representatives from eighteen UN agencies, and a trade exhibition that generated $2.3 billion in signed memorandums. By any institutional measure, the Regional Ecological Summit held on 22–24 April 2026 was a success. Kazakhstan, once again, got its moment as a convening power. The region got a Joint Declaration, a five-year action plan, and a new entry on the multilateral calendar.

What it did not get was a conversation about why water governance in the region has failed.

That omission matters, because water — how it is generated, stored, allocated, and priced across five countries with fundamentally different interests — is the defining strategic variable in Central Asia’s environmental future. And water in Central Asia cannot be separated from energy. The two are bound together in a system whose governance architecture is now approaching the real test.

The outlines of the problem are well known. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan sit at the headwaters. They hold the glaciers, the rivers, and — through Toktogul and Rogun — the hydropower capacity that could cover their energy needs year-round. Downstream, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan depend on those same flows to irrigate agriculture that feeds tens of millions of people. The informal arrangement that kept this system functional during the Soviet period — upstream states release water in summer for irrigation, receive energy in winter in exchange — has never been replaced with anything durable. It runs on bilateral deals, seasonal negotiations, and a level of mutual restraint that climate change is now systematically eroding.

The region does have institutions designed to manage this. The Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC), established in 1992, is mandated to approve annual water withdrawal limits and manage reservoir regimes across all five states. The International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS), founded in 1993, provides the broader political umbrella. Both are active. Both have been active for over thirty years. And neither has proven capable of resolving the core upstream-downstream tension when national interests diverge sharply.

On February 20, two months before the summit, the ICWC held a regular session. The agenda was urgent: reservoir levels across the region were critically low, with significant shortfalls projected for the summer growing season. No unified response emerged. The session exposed, rather than bridged, the structural fault line between upstream and downstream states — the same fault line that has defined regional water politics since 1991. Kazakhstan, which in April would host the summit and sign declarations of environmental solidarity, used the occasion to propose replacing the existing framework altogether. Calling for a new body under a Central Asian Framework Convention on Water Management with real enforcement powers, Astana was tacitly acknowledging what three decades of regional cooperation had not resolved: that existing mechanisms can coordinate but cannot compel. Eurasianet, reporting on the session, noted that the ICWC’s “tactical paralysis” was on full display. The upstream-downstream divide was equally visible in who was sitting at the table. Kyrgyzstan — which holds a substantial share of the region’s glacier and river resources — has suspended its full membership and now attends as an observer, signalling that it no longer considers the commission’s allocation framework compatible with its interests as an upstream state.

RES 2026 touched all of this — but carefully, from a distance. Kyrgyzstan’s President Japarov used the summit to argue for a compensation mechanism for upstream water generation. Tajikistan’s Rahmon floated a regional carbon market. Turkmenistan proposed yet another regional council on water use. These are not frivolous proposals. Several have been on the regional agenda for years, however, without the institutional follow-through that would distinguish them from their predecessors.

The summit’s media coverage made the underlying reality visible in a different way. Each country’s press reported through a strictly national lens — Kazakhstan as generous host, Kyrgyzstan as climate victim owed compensation, Uzbekistan as agenda-setter, Tajikistan as water statesman, Turkmenistan as neutral institution-builder. Read together, those five narratives describe five countries using the shared platform to advance incompatible positions while projecting regional solidarity. This is a fairly accurate reflection of where Central Asia actually stands.

The environmental stakes are real and not in dispute. Glaciers are retreating faster than global averages. The Aral Sea basin remains a slow-motion disaster. Dust storms are intensifying. Urban air quality in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is among the worst in the world. Climate change is compressing the seasonal water cycle that the entire regional economy depends on.

Looming over the entire regional water calculus is a factor none of the five governments controls: Afghanistan’s Qosh Tepa Canal, now nearing completion, is projected to divert up to 20 percent of the Amu Darya’s flow — a river on which Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan depend for the bulk of their agricultural water — with no binding agreement or regional mechanism in place.

What is contested is who pays, who gets, and who decides. RES 2026 did not answer those questions. It gave the region a shared vocabulary and a diplomatic framework — both useful — while the operational body responsible for actual water coordination has been struggling. The real test is the next dry season. Reservoir levels across the region do not respond to declarations.

A region that cannot agree on water allocations for the coming summer has nonetheless agreed on a five-year programme for environmental solidarity. The gap between them is where Central Asia’s real environmental politics lives.

The post Central Asia’s water: solidarity on paper, shortage on the ground first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

On 8 December 2024, Bashar al-Assad fled Syria to Moscow, ending the Assad family’s 53-year rule. The collapse was the culmination of the Deterrence of Aggression offensive led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army. The new government, led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, has established a five-year transitional period until 2030, while foreign governments watch closely for signs of a slide into strict Islamist governance given HTS’s origins as al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra.

For Central Asia, the fall of Assad has reshaped a long-standing concern: the fate of Central Asian foreign fighters who travelled to Syria during the Civil War. These fighters can now be divided into two categories — those who fought with HTS and are being integrated into the new Syrian army, and those held in increasingly untenable ISIS detention camps in the Kurdish-controlled northeast. Both carry significant implications for regional security.

Integration into the Syrian Army

While exact numbers are unclear, reports suggest that at least 2,000 foreign fighters from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan went to fight in the Syrian Civil War — this figure excludes families. Estimates more generally suggest 8,000 to 18,000 foreign fighters and families are being held in detention centres in the Kurdish-controlled north. Around 3,500 of those who supported al-Sharaa have since been integrated into the new Syrian army’s 84th Division.

Given the green light from the United States, al-Sharaa’s government has chosen to integrate foreign fighters into the new Syrian army’s 84th Division, in a deeply risky strategy of “pragmatic normalisation”, or rather the “least bad option.” Out of almost 50 new military roles that have been announced, at least six have gone to foreigners. Most notably for Central Asia, Tajik national Saifiddin Tojiboev was reportedly appointed head of operational headquarters in the Ministry of Defence. The logic behind this comes from a global approach to terrorism which understands that expelling foreign fighters to their countries of origin would destabilise an even bigger geographical region, particularly as foreign fighters are often noted to be even more radical than Syrian and Iraqi soldiers in HTS.

On the one hand, if Central Asians choose to stay in Syria and be integrated into the army and society, it reduces the burden on Central Asia to process and rehabilitate every one of its citizens. Those who choose to return, already a self-selecting group, can be given more attention for a more successful chance of full rehabilitation. Keeping their job and pay ensures that extremists are occupied by a cause other than ISIS, and avoids the disastrous consequences seen by the American blacklisting of all Baathist party members during the invasion of Iraq, which partially led to the creation of ISIS itself.

On the other hand, Central Asian Islamic extremists are being legitimised through acceptance by the Syrian government. This reduces the visibility of punishment for Islamic extremism, which could lead to increased support for such movements. Moreover, established Central Asian extremists in Syria could turn into a source of advice and support for local cells in Central Asia, leading to regional instability through increased terrorist activity.

In balance, however, given that foreign fighters choosing to stay in Syria are less likely to be successfully deradicalised, integration into the Syrian army appears the better option for Central Asia itself, on the condition that greater funding is allocated for anti-terrorism and regional security to anticipate a potential surge. The immediate danger of a new regime expelling these fighters back to Central Asia has been averted — but this could change. Sectarian violence and the growth of an opposition movement could fragment the new government, and the opposition may increasingly view the integration of foreign fighters as the international community exporting its problem onto Syria. “Syria is free, non-Syrians must leave,” protesters said after the burning of a Christmas tree in a Christian neighbourhood of Damascus by foreign fighters in December 2024. Central Asian countries would be wise to plan for this likelihood, making the most of al-Sharaa’s delay of a jihadist exodus to develop policy on a sudden influx of highly radicalised fighters.

The Danger of ISIS Detention Camps

The ISIS detention camps in northern Syria present a separate and arguably more pressing challenge. The “powder-keg” prison camps are the most unstable factor in Central Asia’s repatriation challenge, particularly due to their potential for sudden collapse. Around 50,000 ISIS fighters and their families remain spread across 27 prisons and detention centres, 8,000 to 18,000 of whom are foreign fighters. A UN report in 2023 described open sewers, inadequate housing, limited access to basic necessities, routine violence, and sexual assault. While these camps restrict the ISIS terrorists of today, they simultaneously radicalise and unite a new generation of extremists — 60 percent of detainees at al-Hol and 63 percent at Roj are children, exposed to only ISIS ideology.

The Trump administration’s decision to cut all funding for Blumont, an NGO providing $117 million in essential camp services and security, has heightened the risk. In the first half of 2025 alone, ISIS carried out 149 attacks in northeastern Syria, killing 63 and targeting military outposts. The Syrian government’s relationship to these camps remains unclear, and HTS’s integration of foreign fighters into the army complicates matters further, as it is unclear to what extent HTS considers detained fighters potential allies.

Central Asia’s Repatriation Record

Central Asian countries must prepare for the possibility of these camps’ collapse. Fortunately, the region is in a much stronger position than many other countries. While UN Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014) called for states to develop prosecution, rehabilitation, and reintegration strategies for returning foreign terrorist fighters, most countries have been reluctant to repatriate — the UK’s removal of citizenship in the case of Shamima Begum is emblematic. Central Asian countries, by contrast, are world leaders in repatriation. By March 2024, over 2,100 individuals had been repatriated through humanitarian missions: Kazakhstan welcomed back 754 of its citizens, Uzbekistan 531, Kyrgyzstan 511, and Tajikistan 334.

Rehabilitation programmes differ from country to country, but share a common three-stage structure: (1) adaptation in supervised environments with psychological and medical attention; (2) rehabilitation; (3) reintegration into familiar environments alongside social support. Uzbekistan’s programme can be considered one of the most developed, integrating NGO support, supervised work placements, and the inclusion of otin-oyi (religiously literate women), as well as an imam, to help returning women adapt to local traditional forms of Islam. However, it should be noted that these programmes have largely catered for women and children who have voluntarily returned. The harder challenge of dealing with male fighters who personally committed crimes for ISIS remains largely unaddressed.

Looking Ahead

An in-depth report from the United States Institute of Peace advised, among other measures, the development of specific action plans for reintegration, reduction of stigmatisation of returnees, and building capacity at initial processing centres. These recommendations should now be developed to include emergency capacity — frameworks to rehabilitate those returned to Central Asia involuntarily, and methods focused on male fighters. A dual system of rehabilitation and imprisonment may be better suited to forced returnees from detention camps, considering the extremist organisation by ISIS loyalists seen in al-Hol camp. The simplified gendered view of women “fraudulently taken to this crisis-stricken country, where they were held hostage by terrorists” does not match the reality in all cases.

Al-Sharaa’s provisional government offers Central Asia a grace period to dramatically increase the capacity of rehabilitation programmes. The integration of Central Asian fighters into the Syrian army is, on balance, beneficial for regional stability, though greater attention to bonds between regional radical groups and new players in the Syrian army must be given. Efforts to repatriate Central Asians in untenable detention camps must be continued, and existing rehabilitation processes should be improved. Most crucially, Central Asian governments must plan for scenarios that would impact the region far more than al-Sharaa’s government currently does: civil war, an opposition that expels foreign fighters, or the collapse of ISIS detention centres could all trigger a sudden influx of radicalised individuals still loyal to ISIS.

Central Asia’s determination over a decade to repatriate its citizens from Syria is a positive, world-leading policy. If Europe is eventually forced to change its position on repatriation due to the imminent collapse of detention camps, Central Asia can offer advice and time-tested frameworks. The benefits would extend beyond regional security to improved international relations and the growth of Central Asia into a global leader on the issue of post-conflict rehabilitation.

This report is part of Crossroads Central Asia’s series highlighting analytical work by emerging scholars working on the region.

The post Central Asia’s foreign fighter dilemma in post-Assad Syria first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

Originally published in German as “Depolitisierte Politik: Die Parlamentswahlen 2025 in Kirgisistan,” Zentralasienanalysen, No. 171, 20 February 2026. The English version reproduced with permission.

Kyrgyzstan’s snap parliamentary elections of November 2025 passed with remarkably little public drama. There was no nervous anticipation or widespread political tension. In a country where parliamentary elections twice led to regime overthrow, this contest unfolded as a largely procedural event. For that very reason, it is analytically significant. Rather than marking a step toward regime consolidation, the elections served as a clear demonstration of how consolidated the current political system already is.

Three broader takeaways stand out. First, the 2025 vote confirmed one of the few enduring features of Kyrgyz politics: electoral rules change at every parliamentary cycle. This time, party-list proportional representation was abandoned in favor of a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system in multi-member districts. Second, the elections effectively closed Kyrgyzstan’s long-running experiment with party-based parliamentary politics. While party competition once promised institutionalized politics, it rarely produced parties resembling those found in model parliamentary systems. For much of society, the abandonment of party-list elections registered as little more than a footnote. Finally, the political context of the elections underscored Kyrgyzstan’s alignment with a broader regional, and arguably global, trend toward the strengthening of the executive at the expense of checks and balances.

New parliament by new rules

The 2025 elections confirmed a defining feature of Kyrgyzstan’s political trajectory: parliamentary elections are rarely held under unchanged rules. Since independence, Kyrgyzstan has never conducted two consecutive parliamentary elections using the same rules governing either the parliament’s structure or the electoral system (see Table 1). The only exception – the 2020 elections – ended with the annulment of the voting results.

The November 2025 elections represented yet another major redesign: a full transition to a majoritarian electoral model based on multi-member districts. In one sense, this marked a return to familiar territory – district-based majoritarian elections were used in 1995, 2000, and 2005. At the same time, the reform introduced an important novelty: the adoption of the SNTV system, under which each of 30 constituencies elected three parliament members.

Table 1. Changes in Kyrgyzstan’s Parliamentary Electoral System, 1995–2025

Under the new system, voters cast ballots exclusively for individual candidates, not for parties. Political parties were formally permitted to nominate candidates, but in practice only one party, Yntymak, did so. This outcome was not mechanically predetermined by the electoral formula. In other contexts, parties can and do dominate even under candidate-centered electoral rules. The marginal role of parties in the 2025 elections therefore reflects not only the design of the system, but also the broader irrelevance of parties as meaningful political institutions in Kyrgyzstan.

What do the elections mean institutionally?

The institutional implications of the 2025 elections become clearer when examining how the new electoral design reshapes incentives and outcomes.

First, multi-member districts introduce a stabilizing logic into electoral competition. By allowing more than one candidate to win in each constituency, the system reduces zero-sum outcomes and lowers the likelihood of narrow defeats. In theory, this can reduce political tension by ensuring that multiple resourceful local elites are incorporated into parliament. Such an arrangement helps blunt post-electoral tension, at least compared to the winner-takes-all systems.

Second, the multi-member format made it possible to integrate gender requirements into the electoral framework. The gender quota, first introduced in 2007, proved difficult to implement under proportional representation and would be virtually impossible under single-member districts. The current system requires the presence of both genders among elected candidates in each district, effectively reserving at least one seat for women or men. The gender quota may appear at odds with the country leadership‘s nationalist and socially conservative rhetoric. In practice, however, its enforcement reflects institutional inertia rather than genuine conviction. The quota carries low political cost – certainly lower than the reputational cost the government would incur by attempting to remove it.

Third, the new electoral system structurally sidelines political parties as collective actors. Although parties are formally permitted to nominate candidates, none except one chose to do so. Within days of the parliament’s first session, newly elected deputies organized themselves into so-called “deputy groups.” These groupings reflect residual provisions of parliamentary regulations. They allocate specific roles and resources to deputy groups – a mechanism originally introduced under the 2021 mixed system to allow majoritarian deputies to mirror party factions. These groups function as equivalents of party factions, giving individual deputies collective bargaining power, staff and office resources, and formal rights in legislation, oversight, and nominations that they would not have individually. The composition of these groups offers little evidence of coherent political alignment and does not suggest that they function as substitutes for parties as collective actors.

The end of the party experiment

The November 2025 elections abandoned the party-list electoral system. This came as the culmination of a long-term process rather than a sudden break. Moreover, rather than imposing new rules of politics, it formalized what had already become a reality: the irrelevance of parties on the ground.

While first parties emerged in the early 1990s, the origins of the current phase of party politics lie in 2010: the adoption of a new constitution with a loud rhetoric of building a parliamentary republic. While the 2010 constitution indeed expanded the powers of parliament, the system neither legally nor in practice evolved into a parliamentary model. Within two to three years, the presidency, under Almazbek Atambaev, successfully reasserted its de facto dominance.

Party-list proportional representation quickly revealed serious deficiencies in implementation. Under the closed-list system, voters had little influence over which individuals ultimately entered parliament. Party leadership retained extensive discretion over the ordering of lists and, crucially, over post-election substitutions. The practice of prominent figures withdrawing from party lists shortly after elections, allowing lower-ranked candidates to take their seats, was widely perceived as misleading voters and became a powerful symbol of “party corruption.” Over time, party lists came to be associated less with representation than with transactional politics.

The shift to open party lists in the 2021 elections was intended as a corrective. By allowing voters to cast ballots both for a party and for a preferred candidate within that party, the reform sought to introduce an element of accountability and restore public trust. In practice, however, open lists produced unintended effects: electoral competition shifted inward, with individual candidates competing against one another. As candidates turned to mobilizing personal networks in specific localities to secure preference votes, proportional representation with national party lists devolved into a de facto district-based contest.

By the time of the 2025 elections, party-based parliamentary politics had already lost much of its legitimacy. Political parties had never evolved into durable institutions of political competition; instead, they remained ad hoc and short-lived alliances formed for electoral access. Party switching by the same political figures across electoral cycles had become routine. Against this backdrop, the abandonment of party-list representation did not dismantle a functioning institutional arrangement but formalized the way politics already operated in Kyrgyzstan.

Conclusion

If the electoral outcomes themselves offer limited analytical insight, the broader context in which the 2025 elections were held is more revealing. Some analyses have interpreted the vote as a further step toward regime consolidation. Such readings, however, risk attributing undue causal weight to the elections themselves. The 2025 elections did not deepen consolidation so much as demonstrate it. The muted public reaction to the change in the electoral system, together with the swift and voluntary self-dissolution of the outgoing parliament, exposed a political environment largely devoid of political debate, let alone open dissent.

The resulting system is a centralized and personalized regime that enjoys a relatively high degree of public approval and faces limited international pressure – at least by standards of Kyrgyzstan’s previous governments. Such a configuration may offer stability and predictability, but it also carries an inherent risk of losing the capacity for self-correction in the absence of effective institutional counterweights. Kyrgyzstan’s political history serves as a reminder that a predictable and loyal parliament remains such only until it does not. The central question for the country’s political trajectory is therefore not electoral stability as such, but whether the governing system retains the capacity to reassess its own limits and adapt to recurrent social, political, and geopolitical pressures.

* The article was drafted in January 2026 and does not reflect subsequent developments.

The post Depoliticized politics: Kyrgyzstan’s 2025 parliamentary elections first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 and the rapid consolidation of power by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) marked one of the most consequential political shifts in the Middle East in over a decade. While regional and global actors, most prominently Turkey, Gulf states, the United States, Russia, and Ukraine, moved quickly to position themselves vis-à-vis the new authorities in Damascus, one group of states stood out for their restraint: the countries of Central Asia.

More than a year after Assad’s departure, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have largely avoided formal statements, bilateral initiatives, or clear diplomatic signalling toward the new Syrian government. This silence is striking not only because of Syria’s renewed geopolitical relevance, but also because developments in the Middle East often intersect indirectly with Central Asia’s own security and foreign-policy considerations.

This article argues that Central Asia’s muted response is not the result of indecision or neglect, but a deliberate and calculated strategy. At its core lies the uncomfortable positioning of post-Assad Syria within the broader Russia–Ukraine confrontation. As Moscow and Kyiv compete, both directly and symbolically, for influence in Damascus, any overt engagement with the new Syrian authorities risks being interpreted as a geopolitical alignment. For Central Asian states that remain economically and politically entangled with Russia, strategic silence – much like their approach to the Russia-Ukraine war itself – has emerged as the least costly option.

By examining how Russian and Ukrainian involvement in Syria has shaped Central Asian calculations, this article discusses the logic behind this restraint, the differences in approach among Central Asian states, and the conditions under which silence may eventually give way to cautious engagement.

PATTERNS OF CAUTION IN CENTRAL ASIAN RESPONSES

Public engagement between Central Asian governments and the new Syrian authorities has so far been minimal, confined to large international conferences. However, Central Asian ministers sharing a room with new Syrian officials has not always resulted in public interaction. The search “Syria” on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan’s website is blank. Tajikistan’s last formal interaction was on September 26, 2024 during the 79^th session of the UN General Assembly. In Kyrgyzstan’s case, the most recent entry on its MFA’s website mentioning Syria, published on December 10, 2024, focuses on the 22^nd Doha International Forum held on December 7-8, 2024. Despite the regime change unfolding on December 8, 2024, during the conference, the summary lists Syria only midway in a series of conflicts, an avoidant formulation that chooses to ignore Assad’s flight to Moscow on that very day.

In contrast to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have made limited public references to Syria since December 2024. The 51^st Session of the OIC Ministerial Council was the vehicle used by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for discussions with Syria outside of official bilateral diplomatic meetings, which would require a formal acknowledgement of regime change. Baxtiyor Saidov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Uzbekistan, held talks on the side of the session with Foreign Minister of Syria Asaad Hassan Al-Shaibani, during which “prospects for close cooperation were discussed”. Kazakhstan’s then Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu similarly participated in the session and mentioned the necessary “stabilization of the situation in Syria” and “taking into account the interests of the Syrian people”.

This report is part of Crossroads Central Asia’s series highlighting analytical work by emerging scholars working on the region.

The post Central Asia’s calculated silence on Syria first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

A Regional Initiative Supported by the Volkswagen Foundation

This summer school is part of a year-long initiative supported by the Volkswagen Foundation, with upcoming sessions in Almaty (March 2026) and Tbilisi (September 2026). The project is jointly organized by TU Dortmund University (Germany), Crossroads Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan), Kazakh-German University (Kazakhstan), the University of Georgia, and Tbilisi State University (Georgia).

The initiative seeks to deepen understanding of how social cohesion and public policy interact, while building a vibrant, region-wide network of emerging scholars committed to policy-relevant research.

A Diverse and Dynamic Programme

The four-day Bishkek programme combined lectures, workshops, networking activities, and cultural excursions. It opened with remarks from project leaders Nora Becker (lead coordinator, TU Dortmund), Shairbek Dzhuraev (CCA), and Serik Beimenbetov (Kazakh-German University), along with Daniela Grages, who represented the donor, Volkswagen Foundation. Following these remarks, the main part of the summer school began with a keynote address by Zuhra Halimova (CAPS Unlock) on bridging academia and policy in the region.

Key sessions and themes of the summer school included:

• Research and Methodology Skills – Sessions by Anja Mihr (OSCE Academy) on public policy as a research field; Gabriele Rasuly Paleczek (University of Vienna) on conducting interviews in rural areas; Mehrigiul Ablezova (AUCA) on the benefits and limits of survey research; and a lecture by Serik Beimenbetov on qualitative methods for studying public policy and cohesion.
• Social Cohesion Perspectives – Ilkham Umarakhunov (Search for Common Ground) on community-based cohesion projects and Asel Murzakulova (University of Central Asia) on non-human agency in shaping cohesion.
• Practical Academic Training – Workshops on writing for academic audiences (Sebastian Mayer, OSCE Academy), publishing strategies (Sebastien Peyrouse, George Washington University), and navigating peer-review processes (Aijan Sharshenova and Shairbek Dzhuraev).
• Professional Development – A session on project management for researchers by Nora Becker (TU Dortmund) and a lecture by Aijan Sharshenova (CCA) on empowerment and positionality in academia.
• Ethics and Security in Research – Lectures on research ethics and fieldwork security by Aliia Maralbaeva (Ala-Too University) and Bakhytzhan Kurmanov (University of Central Asia).

Collaboration and Community

Beyond formal lectures and workshops, the summer school placed strong emphasis on building connections among participants. Team-building activities, poster sessions, and an “open market” of research ideas created space for peer-to-peer exchange. Informal settings — from shared meals to interactive warm-ups — further fostered trust and exchange.

Excursions also played an important role. A guided walking tour of Bishkek allowed participants to experience the city in a more personal way, while the visit to the Ata Beyit Memorial Complex provided a moving encounter with Kyrgyzstan’s history and collective memory. These activities underscored the link between academic discussions of social cohesion and the lived realities of the societies in which they take place.

Participants represented Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Germany, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. This diversity of backgrounds and disciplines enriched the discussions and laid the foundation for lasting professional networks across the region and beyond.

Outcomes and Next Steps

The Bishkek summer school succeeded in meeting its twin objectives: strengthening research skills and fostering a regional network committed to policy-relevant scholarship. Participants left with concrete project ideas, peer feedback, and a clearer sense of how their work connects to broader debates on governance, inequality, and social change.

The next steps in the project will take the group to Almaty in March 2026 for the second summer school, where they will continue developing their research outputs and receive advanced training on methodology and dissemination. The programme will culminate in September 2026 with a final school and conference in Tbilisi, where participants will present their findings to a wider academic and policy audience.

Crossroads Central Asia is proud to have hosted the first stage of this ambitious project and remains committed to creating platforms where research, policy, and practice intersect. By supporting young scholars and connecting them across borders, the initiative contributes to building a more robust intellectual community for Central Asia and the Caucasus.

The post Building knowledge and networks: summer school on Social Cohesion and Public Policy first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

Speaking in the session on “Critical Minerals and Clean Energy: Securing Resources for a Sustainable Future,” Dr. Juraev highlighted that Central Asia’s significance lies not only in its mineral wealth but in how these resources are developed, governed, and connected to the region’s long-term future. He emphasized five key points:

• the need for investment beyond extraction into processing and technology transfer;
• the importance of governance, transparency, and ESG standards;
• the value of partnerships that expand the region’s choices rather than reinforce great-power rivalries;
• the role of regional cooperation in harmonising standards and infrastructure; and
• the necessity of investing in local knowledge and expertise to ensure Central Asia shapes, rather than merely supplies, the global clean energy transition.

Dr. Juraev concluded that critical minerals can either reinforce a new “resource curse” or become the foundation of a sustainable future — a choice that depends on the quality of governance and cooperation across and beyond the region.

The post Crossroads Central Asia at the U.S.–Central Asia Think Tank Forum first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

Two well-worn — yet enduring — metaphors are often used to describe the region: the “Great Game,” which casts Central Asia as a passive battleground for global powers, and the “Great Silk Road,” which presents it as a dynamic hub of connectivity. Acknowledging the limits of these narratives, Dr. Dzhuraev used them as a starting point to offer three core observations on the region’s evolving international role.

1. Central Asia is strategically situated—but politically bypassed

Central Asia sits at the crossroads of major powers, each with distinct modes of engagement. Russia’s presence remains deep but increasingly uncertain in light of its war in Ukraine. China has become the region’s largest economic partner, yet its engagement remains limited in cultural and human dimensions. The United States, meanwhile, approaches the region primarily through the lens of strategic concerns linked to Russia, China, and Afghanistan.

While all three powers shape the region’s choices, their rivalries do not translate into clear alliances. Instead, they compel Central Asia to balance, hedge, and maneuver—a skill the region has increasingly mastered.

2. Diversification is Central Asia’s main foreign policy logic

Faced with structural constraints—landlocked geography, limited infrastructure, and reliance on a narrow range of export routes—Central Asian states have embraced diversification not as a strategic ideal but as a necessity. Beyond the major powers, they have deepened ties with Turkey, the European Union, Gulf countries, India, Korea, and Japan. Formats like C5+1, in which South Korea was a pioneer, have become a regular feature of regional diplomacy.

This diversification seeks not only to broaden economic opportunities but also to reduce geopolitical vulnerability and strengthen the region’s autonomy in foreign policymaking.

3. Central Asia should not settle for transit corridor status

The global shocks of COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine have drawn renewed attention to Central Asia’s role in overland trade between Europe and East Asia. With maritime routes and Russian transit corridors becoming increasingly unreliable, the region has emerged as a key logistics artery.

However, Dr. Dzhuraev cautioned against embracing the notion of “corridor status” too readily. While new infrastructure and transit routes are welcome, he emphasized that Central Asia must avoid becoming merely a passageway between “proper rooms.” As he argued, “the region should not settle for being a geography that connects other people’s destinations. It must become a destination in its own right—a room of its own, not just a corridor in between.”

Achieving this requires transforming geographic centrality into economic centrality—through value-added production, regional integration, and long-term investment in human capital and innovation.

Dr. Dzhuraev concluded by noting that Central Asia is on a clearly positive trajectory, projecting confidence and seeking partnerships that reflect a renewed approach to international engagement. What will be critical going forward, he emphasized, is how inter-state and intra-state processes — particularly political leadership and governance — evolve to capitalize on the emerging context and to consolidate the region’s stability and development.

Crossroads Central Asia is proud to contribute to global conversations about Central Asia and its wider neighbourhood.

The post From corridor to destination: rethinking Central Asia’s role in the world first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

The geopolitical shock of 2022 compelled the EU to “rediscover” Central Asia as a region of growing strategic value — geographically, economically, and politically. What felt like peripheral engagement has taken on new weight, with connectivity and diversification now central to Europe’s foreign policy agenda. This recalibration has transformed the region from a niche area of EU interest into a critical part of Europe’s broader response to global instability.

One of the most notable shifts is the EU’s increasingly differentiated approach. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have emerged as anchor states—both engines of regional cooperation and focal points for European diplomacy. High-level bilateral visits to Astana and Tashkent by European leaders mark a departure from the EU’s previous preference for region-wide, Brussels-led engagement. Tailored diplomacy is now seen as essential to advancing European interests in Central Asia.

Equally important is the growing role of individual EU member states. Where EU–Central Asia relations were once channeled almost exclusively through Brussels, countries like Germany, France, and Italy are now pursuing their own strategic partnerships in the region. This adds new political momentum and visibility, diversifying the diplomatic toolkit and signaling a deeper long-term commitment.

Central Asian leaders, for their part, are engaging with the EU in a more pragmatic manner. While continuing to balance relations with Russia and China, they increasingly view the EU as a practical partner, rather than a source of normative pressure. Regional cooperation, a previously rhetorical matter in Central Asia, has gained new momentum, creating opportunities for the EU (and extra-regional actors) to engage with the region as a whole.

Nonetheless, important constraints continue to shape the EU–Central Asia relationship. The EU’s institutional structure limits its capacity to act as a unified and agile foreign policy actor, particularly in strategically fluid environments like Central Asia. Moreover, while recent years have seen a shift toward more pragmatic engagement, the EU will not have fully resolved the tension between promoting values and pursuing interests. Its continued emphasis on democracy and human rights—alongside other priorities like connectivity and energy—can send mixed signals to Central Asian partners. At the same time, the region remains firmly committed to multi-vector diplomacy. The EU is increasingly relevant—but it is still one partner among several, and its influence will depend on its ability to offer strategic coherence, political realism, and sustained commitment.

The post Central Asia and the EU in 2025: what has changed, what has not first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

If you are an early-career researcher interested in social cohesion, public policy, and the dynamic region of Central Asia and the Caucasus, consider joining our international, interdisciplinary, and practice-oriented summer school series titled:

“Social Cohesion and Public Policy in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Disentangling the Linkage Through Ideas, Interests, and Institutions.”

Why Apply?

Participants will:

• Join three summer schools in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Georgia
  
• Work with leading scholars and practitioners from the region and Germany
  
• Develop their own academic or policy-oriented projects
  
• Receive training in methods, publication, public engagement, and more
  
• Produce policy papers, academic articles, or podcasts
  
• Enjoy fully funded participation (travel, accommodation, and meals) 

When & Where?

• Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan | 9–14 September 2025
  
• Almaty, Kazakhstan | 23–29 March 2026
  
• Tbilisi, Georgia | 22–27 September 2026 (Final Conference)
  
• ️ Two online preparatory sessions 

Who Can Apply?

We welcome applications from early-career researchers based in Central Asia, the Caucasus, or Germany who:

• Work on topics related to social cohesion (e.g. trust, identity, inequality) and/or public policy (e.g. governance, education, conflict resolution)
  
• Have a strong command of English
  
• Are eager to collaborate across borders and disciplines 

What to Submit (in English, as a single PDF):

1. CV (max. 2 pages)
   
2. Project proposal (500–1000 words)
   
3. Motivation letter (max. 1 page)
   
4. Optional: Note any accessibility needs (e.g., childcare support) 

Apply By:

20 June 2025 (CET)
Submit to: cacproject@tu-dortmund.de

Shortlisted applicants may be invited to brief online interviews between 23–27 June 2025. Final decisions by end of June.

About the Organizers

This program is a collaboration between:

• Crossroads Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan)
  
• Kazakh-German University (Kazakhstan)
  
• TU Dortmund University (Germany)
  
• The University of Georgia and Tbilisi State University (Georgia)
  Funded by the Volkswagen Foundation. 

Learn more at cac-project.org
Questions? Contact: cacproject@tu-dortmund.de

Download PDF version here.

The post Call for Participants: Summer School Series on Social Cohesion & Public Policy first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.