On 8 December 2024, Bashar al-Assad fled Syria to Moscow, ending the Assad family’s 53-year rule. The collapse was the culmination of the Deterrence of Aggression offensive led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army. The new government, led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, has established a five-year transitional period until 2030, while foreign governments watch closely for signs of a slide into strict Islamist governance given HTS’s origins as al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra.

For Central Asia, the fall of Assad has reshaped a long-standing concern: the fate of Central Asian foreign fighters who travelled to Syria during the Civil War. These fighters can now be divided into two categories — those who fought with HTS and are being integrated into the new Syrian army, and those held in increasingly untenable ISIS detention camps in the Kurdish-controlled northeast. Both carry significant implications for regional security.

Integration into the Syrian Army

While exact numbers are unclear, reports suggest that at least 2,000 foreign fighters from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan went to fight in the Syrian Civil War — this figure excludes families. Estimates more generally suggest 8,000 to 18,000 foreign fighters and families are being held in detention centres in the Kurdish-controlled north. Around 3,500 of those who supported al-Sharaa have since been integrated into the new Syrian army’s 84th Division.

Given the green light from the United States, al-Sharaa’s government has chosen to integrate foreign fighters into the new Syrian army’s 84th Division, in a deeply risky strategy of “pragmatic normalisation”, or rather the “least bad option.” Out of almost 50 new military roles that have been announced, at least six have gone to foreigners. Most notably for Central Asia, Tajik national Saifiddin Tojiboev was reportedly appointed head of operational headquarters in the Ministry of Defence. The logic behind this comes from a global approach to terrorism which understands that expelling foreign fighters to their countries of origin would destabilise an even bigger geographical region, particularly as foreign fighters are often noted to be even more radical than Syrian and Iraqi soldiers in HTS.

On the one hand, if Central Asians choose to stay in Syria and be integrated into the army and society, it reduces the burden on Central Asia to process and rehabilitate every one of its citizens. Those who choose to return, already a self-selecting group, can be given more attention for a more successful chance of full rehabilitation. Keeping their job and pay ensures that extremists are occupied by a cause other than ISIS, and avoids the disastrous consequences seen by the American blacklisting of all Baathist party members during the invasion of Iraq, which partially led to the creation of ISIS itself.

On the other hand, Central Asian Islamic extremists are being legitimised through acceptance by the Syrian government. This reduces the visibility of punishment for Islamic extremism, which could lead to increased support for such movements. Moreover, established Central Asian extremists in Syria could turn into a source of advice and support for local cells in Central Asia, leading to regional instability through increased terrorist activity.

In balance, however, given that foreign fighters choosing to stay in Syria are less likely to be successfully deradicalised, integration into the Syrian army appears the better option for Central Asia itself, on the condition that greater funding is allocated for anti-terrorism and regional security to anticipate a potential surge. The immediate danger of a new regime expelling these fighters back to Central Asia has been averted — but this could change. Sectarian violence and the growth of an opposition movement could fragment the new government, and the opposition may increasingly view the integration of foreign fighters as the international community exporting its problem onto Syria. “Syria is free, non-Syrians must leave,” protesters said after the burning of a Christmas tree in a Christian neighbourhood of Damascus by foreign fighters in December 2024. Central Asian countries would be wise to plan for this likelihood, making the most of al-Sharaa’s delay of a jihadist exodus to develop policy on a sudden influx of highly radicalised fighters.

The Danger of ISIS Detention Camps

The ISIS detention camps in northern Syria present a separate and arguably more pressing challenge. The “powder-keg” prison camps are the most unstable factor in Central Asia’s repatriation challenge, particularly due to their potential for sudden collapse. Around 50,000 ISIS fighters and their families remain spread across 27 prisons and detention centres, 8,000 to 18,000 of whom are foreign fighters. A UN report in 2023 described open sewers, inadequate housing, limited access to basic necessities, routine violence, and sexual assault. While these camps restrict the ISIS terrorists of today, they simultaneously radicalise and unite a new generation of extremists — 60 percent of detainees at al-Hol and 63 percent at Roj are children, exposed to only ISIS ideology.

The Trump administration’s decision to cut all funding for Blumont, an NGO providing $117 million in essential camp services and security, has heightened the risk. In the first half of 2025 alone, ISIS carried out 149 attacks in northeastern Syria, killing 63 and targeting military outposts. The Syrian government’s relationship to these camps remains unclear, and HTS’s integration of foreign fighters into the army complicates matters further, as it is unclear to what extent HTS considers detained fighters potential allies.

Central Asia’s Repatriation Record

Central Asian countries must prepare for the possibility of these camps’ collapse. Fortunately, the region is in a much stronger position than many other countries. While UN Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014) called for states to develop prosecution, rehabilitation, and reintegration strategies for returning foreign terrorist fighters, most countries have been reluctant to repatriate — the UK’s removal of citizenship in the case of Shamima Begum is emblematic. Central Asian countries, by contrast, are world leaders in repatriation. By March 2024, over 2,100 individuals had been repatriated through humanitarian missions: Kazakhstan welcomed back 754 of its citizens, Uzbekistan 531, Kyrgyzstan 511, and Tajikistan 334.

Rehabilitation programmes differ from country to country, but share a common three-stage structure: (1) adaptation in supervised environments with psychological and medical attention; (2) rehabilitation; (3) reintegration into familiar environments alongside social support. Uzbekistan’s programme can be considered one of the most developed, integrating NGO support, supervised work placements, and the inclusion of otin-oyi (religiously literate women), as well as an imam, to help returning women adapt to local traditional forms of Islam. However, it should be noted that these programmes have largely catered for women and children who have voluntarily returned. The harder challenge of dealing with male fighters who personally committed crimes for ISIS remains largely unaddressed.

Looking Ahead

An in-depth report from the United States Institute of Peace advised, among other measures, the development of specific action plans for reintegration, reduction of stigmatisation of returnees, and building capacity at initial processing centres. These recommendations should now be developed to include emergency capacity — frameworks to rehabilitate those returned to Central Asia involuntarily, and methods focused on male fighters. A dual system of rehabilitation and imprisonment may be better suited to forced returnees from detention camps, considering the extremist organisation by ISIS loyalists seen in al-Hol camp. The simplified gendered view of women “fraudulently taken to this crisis-stricken country, where they were held hostage by terrorists” does not match the reality in all cases.

Al-Sharaa’s provisional government offers Central Asia a grace period to dramatically increase the capacity of rehabilitation programmes. The integration of Central Asian fighters into the Syrian army is, on balance, beneficial for regional stability, though greater attention to bonds between regional radical groups and new players in the Syrian army must be given. Efforts to repatriate Central Asians in untenable detention camps must be continued, and existing rehabilitation processes should be improved. Most crucially, Central Asian governments must plan for scenarios that would impact the region far more than al-Sharaa’s government currently does: civil war, an opposition that expels foreign fighters, or the collapse of ISIS detention centres could all trigger a sudden influx of radicalised individuals still loyal to ISIS.

Central Asia’s determination over a decade to repatriate its citizens from Syria is a positive, world-leading policy. If Europe is eventually forced to change its position on repatriation due to the imminent collapse of detention camps, Central Asia can offer advice and time-tested frameworks. The benefits would extend beyond regional security to improved international relations and the growth of Central Asia into a global leader on the issue of post-conflict rehabilitation.

This report is part of Crossroads Central Asia’s series highlighting analytical work by emerging scholars working on the region.

The post Central Asia’s foreign fighter dilemma in post-Assad Syria first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

Originally published in German as “Depolitisierte Politik: Die Parlamentswahlen 2025 in Kirgisistan,” Zentralasienanalysen, No. 171, 20 February 2026. The English version reproduced with permission.

Kyrgyzstan’s snap parliamentary elections of November 2025 passed with remarkably little public drama. There was no nervous anticipation or widespread political tension. In a country where parliamentary elections twice led to regime overthrow, this contest unfolded as a largely procedural event. For that very reason, it is analytically significant. Rather than marking a step toward regime consolidation, the elections served as a clear demonstration of how consolidated the current political system already is.

Three broader takeaways stand out. First, the 2025 vote confirmed one of the few enduring features of Kyrgyz politics: electoral rules change at every parliamentary cycle. This time, party-list proportional representation was abandoned in favor of a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system in multi-member districts. Second, the elections effectively closed Kyrgyzstan’s long-running experiment with party-based parliamentary politics. While party competition once promised institutionalized politics, it rarely produced parties resembling those found in model parliamentary systems. For much of society, the abandonment of party-list elections registered as little more than a footnote. Finally, the political context of the elections underscored Kyrgyzstan’s alignment with a broader regional, and arguably global, trend toward the strengthening of the executive at the expense of checks and balances.

New parliament by new rules

The 2025 elections confirmed a defining feature of Kyrgyzstan’s political trajectory: parliamentary elections are rarely held under unchanged rules. Since independence, Kyrgyzstan has never conducted two consecutive parliamentary elections using the same rules governing either the parliament’s structure or the electoral system (see Table 1). The only exception – the 2020 elections – ended with the annulment of the voting results.

The November 2025 elections represented yet another major redesign: a full transition to a majoritarian electoral model based on multi-member districts. In one sense, this marked a return to familiar territory – district-based majoritarian elections were used in 1995, 2000, and 2005. At the same time, the reform introduced an important novelty: the adoption of the SNTV system, under which each of 30 constituencies elected three parliament members.

Table 1. Changes in Kyrgyzstan’s Parliamentary Electoral System, 1995–2025

Under the new system, voters cast ballots exclusively for individual candidates, not for parties. Political parties were formally permitted to nominate candidates, but in practice only one party, Yntymak, did so. This outcome was not mechanically predetermined by the electoral formula. In other contexts, parties can and do dominate even under candidate-centered electoral rules. The marginal role of parties in the 2025 elections therefore reflects not only the design of the system, but also the broader irrelevance of parties as meaningful political institutions in Kyrgyzstan.

What do the elections mean institutionally?

The institutional implications of the 2025 elections become clearer when examining how the new electoral design reshapes incentives and outcomes.

First, multi-member districts introduce a stabilizing logic into electoral competition. By allowing more than one candidate to win in each constituency, the system reduces zero-sum outcomes and lowers the likelihood of narrow defeats. In theory, this can reduce political tension by ensuring that multiple resourceful local elites are incorporated into parliament. Such an arrangement helps blunt post-electoral tension, at least compared to the winner-takes-all systems.

Second, the multi-member format made it possible to integrate gender requirements into the electoral framework. The gender quota, first introduced in 2007, proved difficult to implement under proportional representation and would be virtually impossible under single-member districts. The current system requires the presence of both genders among elected candidates in each district, effectively reserving at least one seat for women or men. The gender quota may appear at odds with the country leadership‘s nationalist and socially conservative rhetoric. In practice, however, its enforcement reflects institutional inertia rather than genuine conviction. The quota carries low political cost – certainly lower than the reputational cost the government would incur by attempting to remove it.

Third, the new electoral system structurally sidelines political parties as collective actors. Although parties are formally permitted to nominate candidates, none except one chose to do so. Within days of the parliament’s first session, newly elected deputies organized themselves into so-called “deputy groups.” These groupings reflect residual provisions of parliamentary regulations. They allocate specific roles and resources to deputy groups – a mechanism originally introduced under the 2021 mixed system to allow majoritarian deputies to mirror party factions. These groups function as equivalents of party factions, giving individual deputies collective bargaining power, staff and office resources, and formal rights in legislation, oversight, and nominations that they would not have individually. The composition of these groups offers little evidence of coherent political alignment and does not suggest that they function as substitutes for parties as collective actors.

The end of the party experiment

The November 2025 elections abandoned the party-list electoral system. This came as the culmination of a long-term process rather than a sudden break. Moreover, rather than imposing new rules of politics, it formalized what had already become a reality: the irrelevance of parties on the ground.

While first parties emerged in the early 1990s, the origins of the current phase of party politics lie in 2010: the adoption of a new constitution with a loud rhetoric of building a parliamentary republic. While the 2010 constitution indeed expanded the powers of parliament, the system neither legally nor in practice evolved into a parliamentary model. Within two to three years, the presidency, under Almazbek Atambaev, successfully reasserted its de facto dominance.

Party-list proportional representation quickly revealed serious deficiencies in implementation. Under the closed-list system, voters had little influence over which individuals ultimately entered parliament. Party leadership retained extensive discretion over the ordering of lists and, crucially, over post-election substitutions. The practice of prominent figures withdrawing from party lists shortly after elections, allowing lower-ranked candidates to take their seats, was widely perceived as misleading voters and became a powerful symbol of “party corruption.” Over time, party lists came to be associated less with representation than with transactional politics.

The shift to open party lists in the 2021 elections was intended as a corrective. By allowing voters to cast ballots both for a party and for a preferred candidate within that party, the reform sought to introduce an element of accountability and restore public trust. In practice, however, open lists produced unintended effects: electoral competition shifted inward, with individual candidates competing against one another. As candidates turned to mobilizing personal networks in specific localities to secure preference votes, proportional representation with national party lists devolved into a de facto district-based contest.

By the time of the 2025 elections, party-based parliamentary politics had already lost much of its legitimacy. Political parties had never evolved into durable institutions of political competition; instead, they remained ad hoc and short-lived alliances formed for electoral access. Party switching by the same political figures across electoral cycles had become routine. Against this backdrop, the abandonment of party-list representation did not dismantle a functioning institutional arrangement but formalized the way politics already operated in Kyrgyzstan.

Conclusion

If the electoral outcomes themselves offer limited analytical insight, the broader context in which the 2025 elections were held is more revealing. Some analyses have interpreted the vote as a further step toward regime consolidation. Such readings, however, risk attributing undue causal weight to the elections themselves. The 2025 elections did not deepen consolidation so much as demonstrate it. The muted public reaction to the change in the electoral system, together with the swift and voluntary self-dissolution of the outgoing parliament, exposed a political environment largely devoid of political debate, let alone open dissent.

The resulting system is a centralized and personalized regime that enjoys a relatively high degree of public approval and faces limited international pressure – at least by standards of Kyrgyzstan’s previous governments. Such a configuration may offer stability and predictability, but it also carries an inherent risk of losing the capacity for self-correction in the absence of effective institutional counterweights. Kyrgyzstan’s political history serves as a reminder that a predictable and loyal parliament remains such only until it does not. The central question for the country’s political trajectory is therefore not electoral stability as such, but whether the governing system retains the capacity to reassess its own limits and adapt to recurrent social, political, and geopolitical pressures.

* The article was drafted in January 2026 and does not reflect subsequent developments.

The post Depoliticized politics: Kyrgyzstan’s 2025 parliamentary elections first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 and the rapid consolidation of power by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) marked one of the most consequential political shifts in the Middle East in over a decade. While regional and global actors, most prominently Turkey, Gulf states, the United States, Russia, and Ukraine, moved quickly to position themselves vis-à-vis the new authorities in Damascus, one group of states stood out for their restraint: the countries of Central Asia.

More than a year after Assad’s departure, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have largely avoided formal statements, bilateral initiatives, or clear diplomatic signalling toward the new Syrian government. This silence is striking not only because of Syria’s renewed geopolitical relevance, but also because developments in the Middle East often intersect indirectly with Central Asia’s own security and foreign-policy considerations.

This article argues that Central Asia’s muted response is not the result of indecision or neglect, but a deliberate and calculated strategy. At its core lies the uncomfortable positioning of post-Assad Syria within the broader Russia–Ukraine confrontation. As Moscow and Kyiv compete, both directly and symbolically, for influence in Damascus, any overt engagement with the new Syrian authorities risks being interpreted as a geopolitical alignment. For Central Asian states that remain economically and politically entangled with Russia, strategic silence – much like their approach to the Russia-Ukraine war itself – has emerged as the least costly option.

By examining how Russian and Ukrainian involvement in Syria has shaped Central Asian calculations, this article discusses the logic behind this restraint, the differences in approach among Central Asian states, and the conditions under which silence may eventually give way to cautious engagement.

PATTERNS OF CAUTION IN CENTRAL ASIAN RESPONSES

Public engagement between Central Asian governments and the new Syrian authorities has so far been minimal, confined to large international conferences. However, Central Asian ministers sharing a room with new Syrian officials has not always resulted in public interaction. The search “Syria” on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan’s website is blank. Tajikistan’s last formal interaction was on September 26, 2024 during the 79^th session of the UN General Assembly. In Kyrgyzstan’s case, the most recent entry on its MFA’s website mentioning Syria, published on December 10, 2024, focuses on the 22^nd Doha International Forum held on December 7-8, 2024. Despite the regime change unfolding on December 8, 2024, during the conference, the summary lists Syria only midway in a series of conflicts, an avoidant formulation that chooses to ignore Assad’s flight to Moscow on that very day.

In contrast to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have made limited public references to Syria since December 2024. The 51^st Session of the OIC Ministerial Council was the vehicle used by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for discussions with Syria outside of official bilateral diplomatic meetings, which would require a formal acknowledgement of regime change. Baxtiyor Saidov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Uzbekistan, held talks on the side of the session with Foreign Minister of Syria Asaad Hassan Al-Shaibani, during which “prospects for close cooperation were discussed”. Kazakhstan’s then Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu similarly participated in the session and mentioned the necessary “stabilization of the situation in Syria” and “taking into account the interests of the Syrian people”.

This report is part of Crossroads Central Asia’s series highlighting analytical work by emerging scholars working on the region.

The post Central Asia’s calculated silence on Syria first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

A Regional Initiative Supported by the Volkswagen Foundation

This summer school is part of a year-long initiative supported by the Volkswagen Foundation, with upcoming sessions in Almaty (March 2026) and Tbilisi (September 2026). The project is jointly organized by TU Dortmund University (Germany), Crossroads Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan), Kazakh-German University (Kazakhstan), the University of Georgia, and Tbilisi State University (Georgia).

The initiative seeks to deepen understanding of how social cohesion and public policy interact, while building a vibrant, region-wide network of emerging scholars committed to policy-relevant research.

A Diverse and Dynamic Programme

The four-day Bishkek programme combined lectures, workshops, networking activities, and cultural excursions. It opened with remarks from project leaders Nora Becker (lead coordinator, TU Dortmund), Shairbek Dzhuraev (CCA), and Serik Beimenbetov (Kazakh-German University), along with Daniela Grages, who represented the donor, Volkswagen Foundation. Following these remarks, the main part of the summer school began with a keynote address by Zuhra Halimova (CAPS Unlock) on bridging academia and policy in the region.

Key sessions and themes of the summer school included:

• Research and Methodology Skills – Sessions by Anja Mihr (OSCE Academy) on public policy as a research field; Gabriele Rasuly Paleczek (University of Vienna) on conducting interviews in rural areas; Mehrigiul Ablezova (AUCA) on the benefits and limits of survey research; and a lecture by Serik Beimenbetov on qualitative methods for studying public policy and cohesion.
• Social Cohesion Perspectives – Ilkham Umarakhunov (Search for Common Ground) on community-based cohesion projects and Asel Murzakulova (University of Central Asia) on non-human agency in shaping cohesion.
• Practical Academic Training – Workshops on writing for academic audiences (Sebastian Mayer, OSCE Academy), publishing strategies (Sebastien Peyrouse, George Washington University), and navigating peer-review processes (Aijan Sharshenova and Shairbek Dzhuraev).
• Professional Development – A session on project management for researchers by Nora Becker (TU Dortmund) and a lecture by Aijan Sharshenova (CCA) on empowerment and positionality in academia.
• Ethics and Security in Research – Lectures on research ethics and fieldwork security by Aliia Maralbaeva (Ala-Too University) and Bakhytzhan Kurmanov (University of Central Asia).

Collaboration and Community

Beyond formal lectures and workshops, the summer school placed strong emphasis on building connections among participants. Team-building activities, poster sessions, and an “open market” of research ideas created space for peer-to-peer exchange. Informal settings — from shared meals to interactive warm-ups — further fostered trust and exchange.

Excursions also played an important role. A guided walking tour of Bishkek allowed participants to experience the city in a more personal way, while the visit to the Ata Beyit Memorial Complex provided a moving encounter with Kyrgyzstan’s history and collective memory. These activities underscored the link between academic discussions of social cohesion and the lived realities of the societies in which they take place.

Participants represented Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Germany, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. This diversity of backgrounds and disciplines enriched the discussions and laid the foundation for lasting professional networks across the region and beyond.

Outcomes and Next Steps

The Bishkek summer school succeeded in meeting its twin objectives: strengthening research skills and fostering a regional network committed to policy-relevant scholarship. Participants left with concrete project ideas, peer feedback, and a clearer sense of how their work connects to broader debates on governance, inequality, and social change.

The next steps in the project will take the group to Almaty in March 2026 for the second summer school, where they will continue developing their research outputs and receive advanced training on methodology and dissemination. The programme will culminate in September 2026 with a final school and conference in Tbilisi, where participants will present their findings to a wider academic and policy audience.

Crossroads Central Asia is proud to have hosted the first stage of this ambitious project and remains committed to creating platforms where research, policy, and practice intersect. By supporting young scholars and connecting them across borders, the initiative contributes to building a more robust intellectual community for Central Asia and the Caucasus.

The post Building knowledge and networks: summer school on Social Cohesion and Public Policy first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

Speaking in the session on “Critical Minerals and Clean Energy: Securing Resources for a Sustainable Future,” Dr. Dzhuraev highlighted that Central Asia’s significance lies not only in its mineral wealth but in how these resources are developed, governed, and connected to the region’s long-term future. He emphasized five key points:

• the need for investment beyond extraction into processing and technology transfer;
• the importance of governance, transparency, and ESG standards;
• the value of partnerships that expand the region’s choices rather than reinforce great-power rivalries;
• the role of regional cooperation in harmonising standards and infrastructure; and
• the necessity of investing in local knowledge and expertise to ensure Central Asia shapes, rather than merely supplies, the global clean energy transition.

Dr. Dzhuraev concluded that critical minerals can either reinforce a new “resource curse” or become the foundation of a sustainable future — a choice that depends on the quality of governance and cooperation across and beyond the region.

The post Crossroads Central Asia at the U.S.–Central Asia Think Tank Forum first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

Two well-worn — yet enduring — metaphors are often used to describe the region: the “Great Game,” which casts Central Asia as a passive battleground for global powers, and the “Great Silk Road,” which presents it as a dynamic hub of connectivity. Acknowledging the limits of these narratives, Dr. Dzhuraev used them as a starting point to offer three core observations on the region’s evolving international role.

1. Central Asia is strategically situated—but politically bypassed

Central Asia sits at the crossroads of major powers, each with distinct modes of engagement. Russia’s presence remains deep but increasingly uncertain in light of its war in Ukraine. China has become the region’s largest economic partner, yet its engagement remains limited in cultural and human dimensions. The United States, meanwhile, approaches the region primarily through the lens of strategic concerns linked to Russia, China, and Afghanistan.

While all three powers shape the region’s choices, their rivalries do not translate into clear alliances. Instead, they compel Central Asia to balance, hedge, and maneuver—a skill the region has increasingly mastered.

2. Diversification is Central Asia’s main foreign policy logic

Faced with structural constraints—landlocked geography, limited infrastructure, and reliance on a narrow range of export routes—Central Asian states have embraced diversification not as a strategic ideal but as a necessity. Beyond the major powers, they have deepened ties with Turkey, the European Union, Gulf countries, India, Korea, and Japan. Formats like C5+1, in which South Korea was a pioneer, have become a regular feature of regional diplomacy.

This diversification seeks not only to broaden economic opportunities but also to reduce geopolitical vulnerability and strengthen the region’s autonomy in foreign policymaking.

3. Central Asia should not settle for transit corridor status

The global shocks of COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine have drawn renewed attention to Central Asia’s role in overland trade between Europe and East Asia. With maritime routes and Russian transit corridors becoming increasingly unreliable, the region has emerged as a key logistics artery.

However, Dr. Dzhuraev cautioned against embracing the notion of “corridor status” too readily. While new infrastructure and transit routes are welcome, he emphasized that Central Asia must avoid becoming merely a passageway between “proper rooms.” As he argued, “the region should not settle for being a geography that connects other people’s destinations. It must become a destination in its own right—a room of its own, not just a corridor in between.”

Achieving this requires transforming geographic centrality into economic centrality—through value-added production, regional integration, and long-term investment in human capital and innovation.

Dr. Dzhuraev concluded by noting that Central Asia is on a clearly positive trajectory, projecting confidence and seeking partnerships that reflect a renewed approach to international engagement. What will be critical going forward, he emphasized, is how inter-state and intra-state processes — particularly political leadership and governance — evolve to capitalize on the emerging context and to consolidate the region’s stability and development.

Crossroads Central Asia is proud to contribute to global conversations about Central Asia and its wider neighbourhood.

The post From corridor to destination: rethinking Central Asia’s role in the world first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

The geopolitical shock of 2022 compelled the EU to “rediscover” Central Asia as a region of growing strategic value — geographically, economically, and politically. What felt like peripheral engagement has taken on new weight, with connectivity and diversification now central to Europe’s foreign policy agenda. This recalibration has transformed the region from a niche area of EU interest into a critical part of Europe’s broader response to global instability.

One of the most notable shifts is the EU’s increasingly differentiated approach. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have emerged as anchor states—both engines of regional cooperation and focal points for European diplomacy. High-level bilateral visits to Astana and Tashkent by European leaders mark a departure from the EU’s previous preference for region-wide, Brussels-led engagement. Tailored diplomacy is now seen as essential to advancing European interests in Central Asia.

Equally important is the growing role of individual EU member states. Where EU–Central Asia relations were once channeled almost exclusively through Brussels, countries like Germany, France, and Italy are now pursuing their own strategic partnerships in the region. This adds new political momentum and visibility, diversifying the diplomatic toolkit and signaling a deeper long-term commitment.

Central Asian leaders, for their part, are engaging with the EU in a more pragmatic manner. While continuing to balance relations with Russia and China, they increasingly view the EU as a practical partner, rather than a source of normative pressure. Regional cooperation, a previously rhetorical matter in Central Asia, has gained new momentum, creating opportunities for the EU (and extra-regional actors) to engage with the region as a whole.

Nonetheless, important constraints continue to shape the EU–Central Asia relationship. The EU’s institutional structure limits its capacity to act as a unified and agile foreign policy actor, particularly in strategically fluid environments like Central Asia. Moreover, while recent years have seen a shift toward more pragmatic engagement, the EU will not have fully resolved the tension between promoting values and pursuing interests. Its continued emphasis on democracy and human rights—alongside other priorities like connectivity and energy—can send mixed signals to Central Asian partners. At the same time, the region remains firmly committed to multi-vector diplomacy. The EU is increasingly relevant—but it is still one partner among several, and its influence will depend on its ability to offer strategic coherence, political realism, and sustained commitment.

The post Central Asia and the EU in 2025: what has changed, what has not first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

If you are an early-career researcher interested in social cohesion, public policy, and the dynamic region of Central Asia and the Caucasus, consider joining our international, interdisciplinary, and practice-oriented summer school series titled:

“Social Cohesion and Public Policy in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Disentangling the Linkage Through Ideas, Interests, and Institutions.”

Why Apply?

Participants will:

• Join three summer schools in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Georgia
  
• Work with leading scholars and practitioners from the region and Germany
  
• Develop their own academic or policy-oriented projects
  
• Receive training in methods, publication, public engagement, and more
  
• Produce policy papers, academic articles, or podcasts
  
• Enjoy fully funded participation (travel, accommodation, and meals) 

When & Where?

• Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan | 9–14 September 2025
  
• Almaty, Kazakhstan | 23–29 March 2026
  
• Tbilisi, Georgia | 22–27 September 2026 (Final Conference)
  
• ️ Two online preparatory sessions 

Who Can Apply?

We welcome applications from early-career researchers based in Central Asia, the Caucasus, or Germany who:

• Work on topics related to social cohesion (e.g. trust, identity, inequality) and/or public policy (e.g. governance, education, conflict resolution)
  
• Have a strong command of English
  
• Are eager to collaborate across borders and disciplines 

What to Submit (in English, as a single PDF):

1. CV (max. 2 pages)
   
2. Project proposal (500–1000 words)
   
3. Motivation letter (max. 1 page)
   
4. Optional: Note any accessibility needs (e.g., childcare support) 

Apply By:

20 June 2025 (CET)
Submit to: cacproject@tu-dortmund.de

Shortlisted applicants may be invited to brief online interviews between 23–27 June 2025. Final decisions by end of June.

About the Organizers

This program is a collaboration between:

• Crossroads Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan)
  
• Kazakh-German University (Kazakhstan)
  
• TU Dortmund University (Germany)
  
• The University of Georgia and Tbilisi State University (Georgia)
  Funded by the Volkswagen Foundation. 

Learn more at cac-project.org
Questions? Contact: cacproject@tu-dortmund.de

Download PDF version here.

The post Call for Participants: Summer School Series on Social Cohesion & Public Policy first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

This Crossroads Perspectives piece by Emil Dzhuraev, Senior Fellow at Crossroads Central Asia, explores why resilience in today’s world requires more than just building connections. While connectivity has long dominated the global agenda, recent crises have shown the need to also plan for its disruption. Dzhuraev argues that disconnectivity — the ability to survive and adapt when links break — must be developed alongside connectivity as a core element of strategic planning. His commentary offers a timely reminder: true resilience lies in being prepared for both connection and disconnection.

The world – the trading, geopolitical, strategic world – has been breathing connectivity for the last couple of decades. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, launched in 2013, gave it the greatest single impulse, albeit it has been around for longer, part and parcel with globalization, international free trade and especially with the demands of global energy market. No international cooperation, trade and/or development event these days is complete without at least a panel on connectivity.

But the world is rapidly changing, among other areas, in exactly that compartment: connectivity cannot be the sole imperative anymore – we need to think of disconnectivity just as much.

The first recent wake-up call for disconnectivity, globally, came with COVID-19. Countries, cities, neighborhoods and households were tested as to their ability to disconnect from their surroundings. Surviving for various periods – for days and for up to years in some cases – without the regular connections with the outside world, was genuinely and practically a necessity, not just a whim or voluntary experiment. Coming up with safe, affordable and sustainable ways to avoid or bypass the connectivity modes defined as too risky from the epidemic perspective became the ruling logic of life and development in that period.

Just as the world began to emerge from COVID-induced disconnectivity, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 gave rise to a new imperative for disconnectivity: that of excommunicating a gross violator of the international political system. To Russia itself, perhaps, the avalanche of disconnections it saw in the wake of its aggression was not really sudden; it was gradually getting accustomed to sanctions from earlier on, at least from the time of its first overt attack on Ukraine in annexation of Crimea in 2014. For the rest of the world affected by all those disconnections – trade routes, supply chains, manufacturing systems, financial transaction routes and even air traffic routes coming under disruption – the change came at a steep price that they had to take.

In disconnectivity induced by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a notable sub-theme of the phenomenon was in display: the coping strategies to overcome disconnections. The wide array of activity from Russia – from relocations of its citizens and firms to other countries, to its government seeking out loopholes such as North Korea and Iran, to its banks seeking alternatives to SWIFT and its economy opting for import-substitution – suggested some lessons of how relevant actors may try to cope when disconnected. Suffice it to note that when disconnectivity is wielded as a punitive measure against some by others, there is to be expected both a) that a price tag comes for both punishers and the punished and b) that some loopholes and exit ways remain to avoid or evade the punishment.

The most recent – and currently unfolding – imperative for disconnectivity has arisen with the tariff war started by the most connected – and largest – economy of the world against everyone one. Ludicrousness of the formulas for Donald Trump’s tariffs notwithstanding, the damage and challenge has been as grave as one would expect. The longer consequences would be still more serious. In this World vs USA tariff war, all sides got scrambling for their best available, affordable and survivable alternatives they could find – new markets, new suppliers, new treaties, scolding Trump or “kissing” his behind. The scramble applied to all sides, including American business. The flip-flopping tactics in Trump’s tariff policy, doubling the digits here, postponing the tariffs there, while momentarily worsening or improving the stakes for some, strengthened one thing for certain – the imperative of disconnectivity.

When the world settles down from this war and survives in some manner, in addition to the two lessons from the Russian-induced disconnectivity – a) the price is paid by all and b) some loopholes will always remain – there will be one more lesson taken home: c) disconnectivity is about immune systems – it can bolster one’s (a country’s, the world’s) immune system, or – where it was weak from the start – it can break the system.

So, not just a descriptive term for what can happen and has been happening, disconnectivity is indeed an imperative: it is about the (fast rising) need to develop immune systems to be able to survive and thrive when disconnectivity hits/becomes necessary. A few points may be taken for consideration as to what the imperative may command a system (here primarily a state) to do:

• Strategic autonomy – not betting all of your fortunes on agents/places you don’t control;
• Ensuring that there is a self-sufficient economic system that can, at short notice and at least for a time, carry on when unplugged from the outside;
• Ensuring that for any life-sustaining system – such as energy and food supplies, maybe internet and financial systems – there are more sources of supplies than one, and if not, there is actively search for such;
• Connectivity-disconnectivity mechanisms – inter/trans-nationally, all modes of connectivity being built and launched should see mechanisms for disconnectivity – more literally, disconnectability – as part-and-parcel thereof, with understanding that – in a basic rational actor thinking – it is in the best interest of all to have such preparedness even though when the need may arise or who may in fact be (most) affected is not known in advance;
• Open and proactive avenues for switches – be it multi-vectoral foreign policy approaches, flexible and diverse trade links, or others – maintaining an international posture where, at first call, a state is able to activate and thereby balance across its diversity of external links;
• Partial insulation – with the era of boundless globalization and march of global free trade and open borders possibly coming to a point of reversal, it might be plausible to prioritize more home-centered and inward-looking development paths, without – of course – entirely cutting off links to the outside.

For the near term, the imperative of disconnectivity is bound to grow, alas. The pressures of climate change will add more to it for some countries and regions, while pushing some others for more connectivity. The decline of liberal democracy – and rise of illiberal, populist democracies – around the world, and the spread of nationalism and intolerance in its wake, will most certainly lead to still greater disconnections. When digital systems engulf the world to the fullest and blockchains and other manners of virtual control, command and surveillance systems take hold, disconnectivity is likely to see still more buyers.

If that is the reality, then sound development visions must at least seriously and realistically acknowledge it today. (Many countries, companies and other actors are already doing it, albeit without conceptualizing it overtly just yet.) Disconnectivity is a negative idea in one sense and shape, but is also a healthy and necessary proposition in another. Under some potential circumstances, disconnectivity will be a necessity for survival. Hence, even if we brace for the numerous projects of connectivity moving forward, disconnectivity needs always to be within sight in the rearview mirror.

The text was first published at Emil Dzhuraev’s Substack page.

The post The rising imperative of disconnectivity first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

Recently, bilateral and multilateral relations have intensified between the five Central Asian republics and the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In addition to a surge in diplomatic visits and meetings at the state level, there are also signs of increasing GCC investment plans in Central Asia. This is accompanied by growing people-to-people and business  contacts; operators report a rise in travel between the two regions, while experts highlight the GCC as a potential labour migration destination for Central Asian workers.

Against the backdrop of a seemingly encouraging overall picture, it is also important to consider development assistance. In Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are upper middle-income countries, with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan being lower middle-income countries. The latter three Central Asian republics receive development assistance to a larger extent, while Kazakhstan has started developing its own development agency. Nonetheless, all five countries remain assistance recipients.

Traditional development assistance providers are based in the Global North, particularly among Western states. As such, many of the world’s leading development actors, such as the United Kingdom and France, are also former colonial powers. This often raises debates on how to approach aid and ensure historical injustices are addressed. So-called ‘new development assistance’ includes recently emerged major economic powers, who have received development aid themselves in the past, including China, India, and Brazil, among others.

The GCC states thus represent an emerging wave of development assistance providers, having only recently begun to establish their profiles as global development donors. Central Asia, on the other hand, offers opportunities to engage in development aid in a politically safe and transparent manner. Having long been a recipient of development assistance, Central Asia still requires external support but has also accumulated sufficient knowledge and experience to engage with donors efficiently and transparently.

The United Nations recommends developed nations to allocate 0.7 percent of their gross national income (GNI) to development assistance. The leading development assistance providers in the GCC—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates—collectively contributed $9.2 billion in development aid in 2022 alone, concretising the region’s role in global development. Moreover, these states have established formal aid agencies and report significant outbound assistance

At the regional level, the GCC states have contributed to multilateral organisations such as the Islamic Development Bank, where they are major stakeholders. These efforts are often announced at GCC summits or ministerial meetings, with funding decisions aligning their collective strategic priorities. According to a 2023 report by the Center for International Policy Research, in 2021, the UAE provided $47.2 million in development aid to Central Asia, while Qatar allocated $5.2 million. Saudi Arabia contributed $43.6 million, and Kuwait distributed $33.3 million in further development assistance to the region.

Inter-regional multilateral relations are becoming increasingly substantial and regular. The inaugural GCC-Central Asia Summit took place in the Saudi city of Jeddah on July 19, 2023. The next summit is scheduled to be held in May 2025 in the Uzbek city of Samarkand. In between these two milestone meetings, there have been a series of ministerial meetings, where cooperation in trade, economic, investment, transport and communications, cultural, humanitarian, environmental, and tourism sectors were discussed.

However, there remains a gap in the regional landscape in climate finance in Central Asia that must be addressed. The Trump administration’s recent suspension of all foreign aid sent shockwaves across the global development sector, sparking confusion and panic. While the full impact of this decision is yet to be realised and analysed, it is clear that at least some areas of economic development and welfare worldwide—including Central Asia—will require additional support.

In addition, the GCC states, alongside other development donors, have a unique opportunity to carry out a conceptual overhaul of the global development aid approach. Conventional development assistance has faced significant criticism, ranging from neocolonial allegations to concerns about inefficiency. The GCC has both the resources and the strategic positioning to create something new, innovative, and more effective. Entering Central Asia as a relatively neutral actor, the GCC is unburdened by a complicated shared past, unlike Russia, or politically motivated aid, as seen with the EU or the US. This neutrality could help facilitate a mutually beneficial and more equitable partnership between the two regions.

Engaging in development assistance in Central Asia provides the GCC with an opportunity to boost its soft power in the region. There are numerous avenues for bilateral and multilateral cooperation to choose from, including, but not limited to, public healthcare, education, tourism, and poverty alleviation.

However, two key challenges may impede smooth development cooperation between the GCC and Central Asia. First, the GCC lacks a designated agency focused on multilateral development cooperation and the pooling available funds to support developing countries. In contrast to certain nations and other international entities that have separate organisations—such as USAID or EU AID—there is no specific GCC development assistance agency with a distinct name and brand. Branding is crucial in international development, particularly for visibility and public support on the ground. Development assistance serves various objectives, one of which is to build a positive image of the donor, thereby strengthening its soft power on both global and local levels.

The closest equivalent to a dedicated development agency within the GCC is the coordinated effort under the GCC Secretariat General, often linked to initiatives like the Gulf Programme for Development (AGFUND). However, the execution of these efforts is largely delegated to national entities like the Saudi Fund for Development or Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development. National institutions within the GCC’s member states occasionally collaborate in distributing development assistance and work with regional mechanisms or funds set up under the GCC’s guidance.

Second, there is a clear lack of in-depth knowledge and understanding of the local and regional context in Central Asia, as well as the specific needs on the ground. It is no secret that, until recently, the GCC-CA interaction has been fairly limited; both regions have prioritised closer partnerships elsewhere in the world. However, the high-level GCC-C5 Summit in 2023 and the upcoming Summit in Samarkand this year signal a growing commitment from both sides to deepen ties.

Policymakers in the GCC might consider streamlining regional development assistance, channelling it through intra-regional cooperation paths. This approach will help donor coordination, on one hand, and increase the visibility and impact of development assistance on the other. Meanwhile, policymakers in Central Asia could prepare and pitch ready-made proposals on how external national donors might contribute to the region’s economic development and welfare. Clear and transparent requests would make it easier for willing donors to justify their contributions domestically and internationally, creating the space for growth within this delicate dynamic.

While there is limited recent history of deep and meaningful interaction between the GCC nations and the Central Asian republics, the future of inter-regional cooperation appears cautiously bright. As the conventional development partners, such as the US and the EU, either withdraw completely from the international development sector or turn their focus to regions like Ukraine, the GCC countries are emerging as the new key actors in development assistance.

At this stage, Central Asia has accumulated notable experience and expertise in engaging with development cooperation. Countries like Kazakhstan are on the verge of a transition from being recipients of development assistance to becoming providers themselves. But the majority of the region still requires external support, especially in the areas of economic development and transition to renewable energy. In light of this, the GCC could become a much more powerful player in this field.

The article was published by the Bourse & Bazaar Foundation at https://www.bourseandbazaar.org/articles/2025/3/10/gulf-states-offer-development-assistance-in-central-asia-as-western-donors-step-back.

The post Bridging regions: Central Asia and the Gulf States deepen cooperation first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.