The European Union (EU) is a relatively new actor engaging with new states in Central Asia. Its engagement is modest but consistent. Because of Russia’s war in Ukraine, Brussels seeks to become more strategic in its political, economic and security engagement. The EU is, however, unlikely to step away from soft power engagement or emphasising human rights. These and related matters are often discussed through the lenses of ‘what’ questions: What the EU seeks to achieve in Central Asia, or what Central Asian states’ interests are in engaging with the EU. In contrast, this paper examines the EU’s Central Asia policy through ‘why’, ‘who’ and ‘how’ questions, namely ‘why’ the EU engages with Central Asia, ‘who’ are the drivers of the EU’s Central Asia policy and ‘how’ this engagement comes about. 

WHY? 

The European Union’s ambitions are high, while its actual engagement with the region remains modest. European interests are centred on trade, stability, human rights, and development cooperation. 

Talking to neighbours of neighbours 

The EU became a foreign policy actor in the nineties and especially the 2000s, mainly against the backdrop of the war in former Yugoslavia.  After the 2004 and 2007 enlargements and getting actively involved in peacebuilding and promoting its integration and regional cooperation narrative in South East Europe, the EU also started to look further afield. It developed developed cooperation programmes with North Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe, including the South Caucasus, bringing all together in 2004 in the European Neighbourhood Policy. 

Whereas the Eastern Partnership (EaP), launched in 2009, was built on a vast basis of engagement, the 2007 EU Strategy for Central Asia can be considered a start of cooperation with the region of Central Asia (bilateral ties already existed).

Because the Central Asian region is located in-between China and Russia and has few ties with the Caucasus, Europe started pitching Central Asia as ‘the neighbours of the neighbours’. The EU sees Central Asia still in the framework of ‘former Soviet republics’ and as an extension of Europe. This is why foreign ministries (and think tanks) often coin the term ‘Europe and Central Asia’, recognising that Central Asia is not Europe geographically but an extension of Europe due to its Soviet past.

European interests

European interests in Central Asia are minor compared to other regions. Nonetheless, the EU as an institution is a formidable actor on behalf of Europe in Central Asia. In many areas, European foreign policies still rely on past colonial ties. Thus, Spain and Portugal actively shape EU policy towards Latin America, while France is a driver of approaches to North Africa and the Sahel. Because there is no European colonial past with Central Asia, no member state feels responsible for an approach on Central Asia-related matters. As a result, EU member states leave European policy towards Central Asia with the institutions. The exception is Kazakhstan, which hosts embassies from most EU member states, primarily reflecting trade interests.

At the time of the EU strategy development in 2007, energy security was a key driver to engage with Central Asia. Russia was nationalising its energy sector, curtailing European and American energy companies and using pipelines as a weapon to pressure European neighbours. When large-scale energy connections over land and via the Caspian Sea were deemed non-viable, attention shifted to security as the EU sought to step up ties with Central Asia while NATO withdrew from Afghanistan. Soon after, the security focus was replaced by a trade and transit focus as the EU sought to respond to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Thus, the EU developed the ‘Connecting Europe and Asia’ strategy in 2018. The 2019 EU strategy for Central Asia sought to bring over a decade of shifts of interest together in an updated document by highlighting ‘resilience’ (including values and security), ‘prosperity’ (including energy and environment) and the mantra of ‘regional cooperation’ that the EU continues to promote. [continue reading]

The post Modest but consistent: EU policymaking towards Central Asia first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

The new strategy, as outlined in the Joint Communication of the European Commission and the Higher Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, features both continuity with and departure from the previous document (for related analyses, see pieces by Catherine Putz and Fabienne Bossuyt). Thus, the speakers noted the new document still manages to touch upon nearly all policy areas and issues, something often raised concerning the 2007 strategy. The “catchall” nature of the document might reflect the peculiarities of the EU institutions and as well as solid preparatory research. Yet, it will likely generate an all-too-familiar criticism on a mismatch between the expectations raised and delivery in the coming years.

One early difference to note is an optimistic tone in assessing development trends in the region and the dominance of economic and technical vocabulary in the language. Introductory paragraphs stress the developments in the region offer “new opportunities” for cooperation and hail the “new momentum” in intra-regional cooperation in Central Asia. Such optimism likely stems from the recent political changes in Uzbekistan, much discussed as a “window of opportunity” for greater cooperative relations in the region. However, speakers argued this optimism in the document might convey a deliberate shift towards a more cautious and pragmatic painting of the EU’s Central Asia agenda, or a declining level of confidence of the EU in terms of its role in the region. Or both.

Three particular aspects of the Strategy suggest the EU might be changing (or struggling with finding) its voice in the region. First, the document does not come close to defining the EU as a normative power. While human rights and democracy feature in one subsection, the Strategy does nothing to acknowledge the progress (or lack thereof) in the region concerning these. More importantly, the Strategy does not make it clear that norms and values are the central “added value” that the EU can, wants and will bring to its cooperation partners in Central Asia. This robs the EU of its single most potent “comparative advantage” of being a system built on liberal values, respect for human rights and the rule of law.

Second, and related, the references to “non-exclusive” nature of the EU-Central Asia partnership, acknowledgement of the need to work with “third countries”, and substantial emphasis on integrating Afghanistan in the EU-Central Asia programmes suggest the EU’s Central Asia strategy is increasingly about parties beyond Central Asia. The above references perhaps reflect the changing geopolitical circumstances and lessons learned from the EU’s engagement with other neighbouring countries. The question is whether the EU’s view of Central Asia is increasingly shaped by what and how other actors operate in the region, and if so, whether this weakens rather than strengthens the EU’s appeal for actors in Central Asia.

Third, the Strategy remains state-centric in its view of the partnership, despite encouraging proposals for greater people-to-people and private business engagement. The capacity and even the nature of state institutions vary in the region. In Kyrgyzstan, the record shows that a) the state institutions’ potential to implement reforms is severely limited for different reasons, and b) assisting and training various state institutions (such as the parliament, judiciary) thus far produced little if any, substantive improvements in the core problems plaguing them. The latter are familiar to all, including corruption, disrespect/disregard for the rule of law and democratic values.

The above are general observations based on the text of the Joint Communication. The latter, being a framework document, addresses concerns raised by a variety of relevant stakeholders, and for the same reason, cannot easily fit the demands of all parties. The success of the Strategy, therefore, hinges to a great extent on the actual implementation. The EU-Central Asia partnership will likely not tick all the boxes, but it is all up to the parties to work towards ticking the boxes that matter most. In this respect, the round table discussion touched on three particular issue areas highlighted in the Strategy: economic cooperation, supporting education and communication.

How could Kyrgyzstan benefit economically most from deeper cooperation with the European Union? As roundtable speakers stressed, the top three parts of the Kyrgyz economy to benefit from a greater partnership would be tourism, trade, and transfer of technologies. While there is no shortage of discussion of these, and understanding of their importance, there are specific areas where the EU could help address the key risks. One major problem haunting Kyrgyzstan is a lack of an up-to-standard system of quality control. This applies to different areas, such as a certification system for the export-oriented industry, security standards within tourism, insurance and others. Small and medium businesses are particularly affected, given the costs associated with the above. The Strategy, to its credit, touches on most of these, and follow-up engagement would be most relevant for Kyrgyzstan.

In the area of education that the EU has traditionally prioritised in Kyrgyzstan, two major risks need to be taken into account and addressed. First, supporting the education sector through budget support does not contribute to the transparency of the reform agenda. Greater engagement with civil society, parents and students is needed in identifying “what, why and how” of donor support in the education sector. This would undoubtedly help prevent situations when millions of dollars/euros get spent on ad hoc projects that lead to nothing and nowhere. Second, and related, a special donor coordination agency may be set-up within the education sector to ensure maximum complementarity and consistency across different projects and balance interests of various donor agencies, the government and broader civil society.

Finally, the mention (significant in itself) of the need for a better communication strategy needs to be followed up with a much more substantive to-do plan. Values have always been central in Central Asians’ view of the European Union. If the Strategy failed to meet the mark in this regard, the communication strategy should rectify this. Both the EU and Central Asian parties should stress the cooperation is, and should be, less about money and aid, and more about values and exchange. To communicate this, closer and less bureaucratized engagement with local media, civil society, think tanks and academia, will remain critical.

The post A round table on the new EU strategy for Central Asia: a summary first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

Introduction 

A new strategy of the European Union on Central Asia is due to be adopted by the end of 2019. Recommendations in the course of the preparatory discussions included familiar, though important, calls for a better balance of norms and interests of the regional and bilateral agendas.^[1] Along with these, a novel concept, ‘connectivity’, appears to become an important framework for the EU’s engagement with Central Asia. In fact, connectivity was recently unveiled as the heart of Europe’s new vision for Asia, not Central Asia. But, as the EU High Representative-Vice President Federica Mogherini recently emphasised, connectivity would be relevant for Central Asia too, which is “the crossroads, the meeting point of two continents”.^[2]

If Central Asia is to be included in the EU’s “connectivity” paradigm, a closer look at the region’s state of international connectivity is necessary. First, the region has developed peculiar connections with other major extra-regional powers, namely Russia and China. Second, the countries of the region remain remarkably under-connected with, if not disconnected from, each other. These may affect the level of commitment that Central Asian leaders can take with the EU. But, more importantly, these (dis)connections reveal the kind of problems that make the EU’s support to Central Asia even more important. The discussion proceeds with a focus on the smaller and poorer states of the region, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Central Asia’s need for the right kind of connectivity

Much praised as an ancient Silk Road land, the region was effectively a dead-end in the early 1990s, burdened by both distance from “lucrative markets” and proximity to “unattractive neighbours, would-be hegemons and war-torn states”.[3] Intra-regional connections have never thrived, making scholars see Central Asia as one of the most “dis-integrated and disconnected regions in the world”.^[4] To be sure, there are areas where Central Asia has actually grown well connected to the wider world. Thus, while the movement of legitimate goods faced severe restrictions, the region has long turned into a major transit zone for narcotics. Similarly, while an ordinary Central Asian cannot freely travel to the US or Europe when she/he wishes to do so, the ruling elites have long become generous customers of Western banks and real estate agencies.[5] The challenge, thus, is how could Central Asia connect to the world in ways that would benefit a broader population in a sustainable way?

The EU’s concept of connectivity provides an attractive response to the above question. Connectivity is defined as being “about bringing countries, people and societies closer together”.^[6] In a broader sense, “connectivity” appears a refreshed take on what once were the mainstream concepts of regional integration and globalisation. The Joint Communication, though, adds its own touch, stressing “the European way” of connectivity to be “sustainable, comprehensive and rules-based”, promoted through building transport corridors, digital connections, people’s movement and standards and rules to networks “interoperable”.^[7]

Beyond sounding a progressive concept in itself, connectivity will clearly resonate with the needs of Central Asia. The intra-regional trade remains limited, while external trade routes are anything but balanced. The change of leadership in Uzbekistan led to a more open foreign policy, creating a window of opportunity for greater connectivity projects in the region. This said, there are several aspects of Central Asian connectivity today that shall inform the EU’s strategy. First, Central Asian states are already engaged in forms of connectivity with other extra-regional powers. Second, the discrepancy and disconnectedness between Central Asian states remain staggering.

Russian connection: remittances

As the Soviet Union collapsed, the newly independent Central Asian states were seen as little more than the Russian underbelly. Much changed since then, not least due to the inability of Russia to compete with the West and, more recently, with China, as a source of economic support for the region. Russia remained the primary extra-regional actor, however, not least through its political-military influence and dominance in mass media. A number of inter-state alliances, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organisation or the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) further bind the countries of the region to Russia. These should not, however, overshadow the salience of a less visible but no less consequential channel of the Russian connection to two issues of stake to the smaller states of the region: labour migration and remittances.

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are in the world’s top three remittance-dependent countries. In 2017, for instance, remittances amounted to 32.9 per cent and 31.6 per cent of their GDPs.^[8] In 2008 the figure for Tajikistan was staggering 49.3 per cent. The transfers are sent mostly from Russia, which hosts about 700,000 Kyrgyz and over one million Tajik citizens as labour migrants, over 10 per cent of their populations. Given high unemployment and poverty levels, particularly in rural areas, remittances are vital not only for households’ daily well-being but also for sustaining the local economies.

Labour migration is not only a matter of economic well-being. The sheer number of Kyrgyz and Tajiks living and earning in Russia make this a major political and policy issue. The well-being of Kyrgyz and Tajiks in Russia, many living on dubious legal grounds, is often found in direct correlation with the state of bilateral relations. During heated debates in Kyrgyzstan over joining the EAEU, the benefits (from accession) and potential damage (in case of non-accession) for Kyrgyz migrants in Russia turned out to be one of the major selling points for EAEU. Similarly, Tajik analysts linked Dushanbe’s reluctance to join the EAEU as one of the reasons for a growing number of deportations of Tajik citizens from Russia in 2016.^[9]

Chinese connection: debt and road diplomacy?

Central Asia’s connections with China are ever growing. Due to its location, Central Asia is naturally involved in the Chinese grand project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Of the six land corridors envisaged, two are supposed to cross Central Asia. So far, the BRI has little to demonstrate in Central Asia. But China’s role should not be assessed by the progress in actual highways constructed only. The BRI builds on, gives a name to, and potentially expands on the already massive engagements that China has developed with Central Asia since the 2000s. This engagement is best observed in relation to China’s sovereign loans in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

As of early 2018, over 40 per cent of the external debt of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan was owned by China (see Chart 1). The figure is much higher if one looks at loans received in recent years. The emergence of China as a lender in the late 2000s matched perfectly with the acute need for basic infrastructure investments in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, mainly in roads and the energy sector. Chinese loans were preferred to others. In the words of the Kyrgyz deputy Finance Minister, they brought “less burdensome conditions” and did not demand co-funding.^[10] That said, the lack of strict transparency requirements also made Chinese loans preferred. Two former Prime Ministers of Kyrgyzstan were arrested in 2017 accused of “lobbying” a nearly 400-million Chinese loan for the renovation of the Bishkek heating station. While this is likely to be an instance of political infighting than fighting corruption, the case of the defendants is not helped by an absence of meaningful documentation on how the money was actually spent.^[11]

Chart 1  External debts of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, in billion USD, 2018.^[12]

How the staggering level of sovereign debts to China will play out is still to be seen. Optimists suggest that the economic growth in recipient countries will allow comfortable repayment.^[13] But there are signs that the growing debts may turn China into a bigger actor in the region’s economy. The recent decision of the Tajik government to issue a license for a gold mine to the Chinese TBEA company points to one of the ways in which the loans can help China to expand its role in the local economies of Central Asia.^[14] Beijing might also be growing more comfortable about being less benign with Central Asians. Citing a blast at its embassy in Bishkek in 2016, China severely toughened visa issuance for Kyrgyz citizens, true to this day. In the words of Kyrgyz businessmen, this led to Chinese lorry drivers to overtake the roads and drive Kyrgyz out of business.^[15]Traders of renowned bazars, such as Dordoi, in turn, speak about acquiring a Kazakh citizenship as an easier way to travel to China for goods than trying it with a Kyrgyz passport.

Intra-regional disconnections

The third potential obstacle for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to connect is internal. Both countries have a troubled history with Uzbekistan, the most populated and centrally located country of the region. The list of unresolved problems is long, featuring conflicts over trans-boundary water resources, energy supplies and incomplete border delimitation. The new leadership in Tashkent appears more open to sit and discuss such matters, but tangible changes in relations to these remain to be seen.

Bilateral matters aside, the connectivity of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan into a wider economic network is hampered by the smallness of their markets, the under-developed economies and difficult terrain. The countries lack major energy resources and are avoided as potential transit territories for energy pipelines.^[16]In addition to small size economies, the countries’ populations are also poorer compared to other countries in the region (see Chart 2). They are compounded by a mountainous terrain that severely limits possibilities for railways and highways. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have shortest railroads systems (Chart 3). Striving to cut dependence on each other, Central Asian states have managed to destroy the Soviet-built common transport and electricity networks.[17]

Chart 2 GDP per capita,  PPP (current international US$), 1997-2017.^[2]

^[1] Compiled from World Bank Databank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IS.RRS.TOTL.KM?view=chart

Chart 3 Length of railroads, in km.

^[2] Compiled from World Bank Databank, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx.

Conclusion 

The three issues reviewed above do not pose an obstacle to the EU strategy in Central Asia. Clearly, Brussels is not in geopolitical competition against other powers in the region. Yet, the above discussion points to one problem that is central to the EU as well: the weakness and vulnerability of Central Asian states and societies. Labour migrants in Russia give Moscow political leverage. This is a cause of the economic collapse of emigrating Central Asian countries. Chinese loans might have turned Beijing into a more influential actor in Central Asia, perhaps also feeding corrupt elites on both sides of the aisle along the way. Yet, they proved crucial to reconstruct some failing infrastructure, including roads and energy facilities in Central Asia. This suggests that supporting a stable, developing and connected Central Asia requires, above all, strengthening local capacity in the region.

Supporting Central Asian states to grow as viable and politically stable states is easier said than done, and the “to-do” list would not be short. Below are only three of may possible proposals that the EU is well placed to address and could take into consideration.

First, today the EU is well-positioned to make a difference towards improving internal regional connectivity through encouraging more intense high-level communication. The EU is not seen as an actor engaged in great power rivalry in the region, which makes its presence welcome by both regional and non-regional actors. It is encouraging to see an increasing engagement of Brussels in “5+1” format as well as relentless activism in the region by the Special Representative for Central Asia. A shift towards greater openness for international engagements on the side of Uzbekistan might present a best possible circumstance from within the region. Internal connections primarily depend on Central Asians themselves, but given the conducive context, the EU should double down on its existing support for cross-border trade, freedom of movement and a burgeoning spirit of cooperation at higher levels.

Second, employment, and sustainable economic development more broadly, deserve to become key improvement in the region, and the EU should aim at those. This is relevant for the problem of labour migration, but in the longer-term, is also critical for stability and security in the region. Goals such as assisting the education sector, encouraging EU-oriented exports and improving accountability and transparency, should be planned and pursued with an eye on supporting small and medium businesses that create most jobs within the region.

Finally, the EU will promote benefits for itself and Central Asian states and societies by supporting regional expertise for policy research and analysis. If corruption is a known malaise of the governance in the region, incompetence is another. The combination does not make the governments too receptive of policy advice from outside. However, the need for such advice is palpable, and think tanks industry must grow to make itself relevant. Informing and engaging with a broader audience, beyond policy-makers, is no less important for research communities. The current “public” brainstorming for the new EU strategy for Central Asia has been exclusively driven by the EU. It remains to be seen whether and when would the Central Asian governments and policy community start strategizing their relations with the EU in the same way.

By Shairbek Dzhuraev, Jan 10, 2019*

Notes

* The paper was originally posted at “Around the Caspian: a Doctoral Training for Future Experts in Development and Cooperation with Focus on the Caspian Region”, at http://caspianet.eu/about/, on January 10, 2019.

^[1] See Marlene Laruelle, Andreas Marazis, and Tika Tsertsvadze, “A New EU-Central Asia Strategy: Deepening Relationships and Generating Long-Lasting Impact,” EUCAM Working Paper, November 4, 2018, https://eucentralasia.eu/2018/11/a-new-eu-central-asia-strategy-deepening-relationships-and-generating-long-lasting-impact/, Katrin Böttger and Julian Plottka, “A New Start for the EU Central Asia Policy in 2021? Current State, Developments and Perspectives for the Revision of the EU Central Asia Strategy,” L’Europe en Formationn° 385, no. 1 (December 4, 2018): 45–60.

^[2] European External Action Service, “Remarks by High Representative-Vice President Federica Mogherini at the Press Conference Following the EU-Central Asia Ministerial Meeting,” November 23, 2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/54363/remarks-high-representative-vice-president-federica-mogherini-press-conference-following-eu_en.

[3] Celeste Wallander, “Silk Road, Great Game or Soft Underbelly? The New US-Russia Relationship and Implications for Eurasia,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 3, no. 3 (September 2003): 98.

^[4] Luca Anceschi, “The Resurgence of Central Asian Connectivity,” The Diplomat, December 1, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/the-resurgence-of-central-asian-connectivity/.

[5] See Alexander Cooley and John Heathershaw, Dictators Without Borders: Power and Money in Central Asia, 1 edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017).

^[6] The Chairs’ Statement of the 13th ASEM Foreign ministers meeting in Na Pyi Taw, Myanmar, on 20-21 November 2017, available at https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000309716.pdf.

^[7] European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, “Connecting Europe and Asia – Building blocks for an EU Strategy”,  Joint Communication, 19 September 2018.

^[8] Ranking second and third respectively, after Tonga, and followed by Haiti. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?end=2017&start=1970&view=chart&year_high_desc=true

^[9] Asia-Plus, “The Number of Cases of Deportation of Tajik Citizens from Russia Increasing,” October 5, 2016, https://news.tj/en/news/tajikistan/society/20161005/231636.

^[10] Bakyt Orunbekov, “Neubyvayushchii vneshnii dolg (Non-decreasing foreign debt),” February 15, 2018, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/kyrgyzstan_china_debt/29040734.html.

^[11] Yulia Kostenko, “Schetnaya palata KR: pri modernizatsii TETS Bishkeka ne byli sostavleny smety raskhodov (Accounting Chamber of the Kyrgyz Republic: No cost estimates were made when upgrading Bishkek’s heat and power plant),” 24.kg, November 17, 2017, https://24.kg/ekonomika/68543_schetnaya_palata_kr_pri_modernizatsii_tets_bishkeka_nesostavlenyi_smetyi_rashodov/.

^[12] Avesta, “Tadzhikistan Dolzhen Kitayu Svyshe $1,2 Mlrd (Tajikistan Owes China over $ 1.2 Billion),” Avesta, February 20, 2018, http://avesta.tj/2018/02/20/tadzhikistan-dolzhen-kitayu-svyshe-1-2-mlrd/., Aidai Erkebaeva, “Kyrgyzstan ustanovil limit dolga pered kreditorami. Chto eto znachit? (Kyrgyzstan has set a limit on debt to creditors. What does it mean?),” Kloop.Kg, March 26, 2018, https://kloop.kg/blog/2018/03/26/kyrgyzstan-ustanovil-limit-dolga-pered-kreditorami-chto-eto-znachit/.

^[13] Dirk van der Kley, “Can Central Asia’s Poorest States Pay Back Their Debts to China?,” The Diplomat, December 1, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/can-central-asias-poorest-states-pay-back-their-debts-to-china/.

^[14]Eurasianet, “Tajikistan: Chinese Company Gets Gold Mine in Return for Power Plant”, April 11, 2018, https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-chinese-company-gets-gold-mine-in-return-for-power-plant.

^[15] Radio Azattyk, “Poluchit’ vizu v Kitai stalo slozhnee (Receiving Chinese visa became more complicated),” February 23, 2017, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/28326412.html.

^[16] Thus, in 2007 the Kyrgyz prime minister Atambaev explicitly asked Chinese Hu Jintao to make the planned Turkmen-Chinese gas pipeline to cross Kyrgyzstan. This was proved in vain three days later, with the route approved to bypass Kyrgyzstan. See Obschestvennyi Reiting, “Nadezhdy Kyrgyzstana Provesti Gazoprovod Turkmenistan-Kitai Cherez Svoyu Territoriyu Ne Opravdalis’ (Kyrgyzstan’s Hopes to Have Turkmenistan-China Gas Pipeline Cross Its Territory Did Not Materialize),” August 20, 2007, http://www.pr.kg/old/archive.php?id=18961.

[17] One latest development was the completion of Angren-Pop railway by Uzbekistan in 2016, bypassing northern Tajikistan. See Radio Azattyq, “Tashkentu bol’she ne nuzhna zheleznaya doroga cherez Tadzhikistan (Tashkent no longer needs railway through Tajikistan),” February 26, 2016, https://rus.azattyq.org/a/uzbakistan-zheleznaya-doroga-tajikistan/27575251.html

^[18] Compiled from World Bank Databank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IS.RRS.TOTL.KM?view=chart

^[19] Compiled from World Bank Databank, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx.

The post Grand strategies for small states: what connectivity for Central Asia? first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

However, long-term stability of the region cannot be pursued without addressing some less visible, yet critical problems. These are often issues of domestic nature that set the very environment within which a stable and prosperous development can be imagined. While national governments are primarily responsible for addressing (or not addressing) these challenges, international partners of the region have a big role to play. This brief looks at three particular areas – education, economy and equality – that are critical for sustainable development of the region and deserve more national and international attention.

A convenient stability

One can hardly generalise about “threats to stability” in Central Asia. The differences between Central Asian states’ economic situations, political systems and foreign policies can hardly be ignored. Yet, the recent twenty-six years saw a consistent prominence of hard security issues in discussions about stability across the region. In particular, the returning motives include non-traditional security threats (terrorism/extremism, religious radicalisation, drug-trafficking), inter-state conflicts (borders and water disputes) or possible spill-over of the war in Afghanistan, especially in the context of the NATO withdrawal in 2014. While legitimate in many ways, the above issues should be viewed with at least a few caveats.

First, the sacrosanct meaning attributed to the stability of Central Asia, as a condition of equilibrium, has two roots. In the first place, such understanding of stability was fostered by the acceptance of stability as a value, by Central Asians (and external observers), preoccupied with “economic turmoil and lawlessness” in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse.^[1] In the second place, it is fostered by a change in development aid after the Cold War: from the principle of non-interference to an intervention (not necessarily a military one, but also by funding of development projects) which targets potential hard security threats in Central Asia, the ones which may eventually affect donor countries.

Second, the governments in Central Asia learned how to use the rhetoric of international security. The 9/11 attacks and ensuing US/NATO intervention in Afghanistan put Central Asian states at the forefront of the war on terrorism. This provided a new security framework for the region’s cooperation with the western world, which proved to be more convenient for collaboration than the previous alignment based on a vocabulary of democratisation, good governance and human rights. Central Asia’s non-western allies share a similar language of security, best illustrated by an oft-cited goal of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization – fighting “three evils” of terrorism, separatism and extremism. Such language allows a very broad interpretation and merges the distinction between international security, state security and security of specific regimes, as it legitimises silencing of any forces which might challenge current political constellations in Central Asia.

Third, many security issues that can be found on top of national agendas are outcomes of, or tightly linked to, problems in other areas. One can hardly address the problem of “religious radicalisation” by targeting “radicalised” individuals, confiscating suspicious religious literature or labelling some groups as “extremist” while ignoring underlying problems –  the condition of education or restricted political participation. Drug-trafficking cannot be effectively fought by solely upgrading the scanners or training sniffer dogs at border checkpoints, if corruption and organised crime are left aside, not to mention the demand for narcotics in countries of their destination. Focusing on often invisible roots of security issues may not be very expedient politically or convenient for the logic of project-cycles preferred by international partners. Yet, these precise roots of security issues will keep hampering human security in the region, if not addressed.

Thus, actors genuinely concerned about the long-term development of Central Asia should remain attentive to who and how defines “threats” or “stability”. The region’s long-term stability, however, hinges on developing an environment which would enlighten and empower citizens, and this should be a priority for both national and international policy-makers.

Inconvenient yet critical: education, economy and equality

A report on threat perceptions of the governments of OSCE participating states noted, with a surprise, “the salient prominence of perceived domestic threats combined with questions about the efficiency and legitimacy of governance”, as opposed to more traditional notions of military and transnational security threats.^[2] This finding resonates very well with our understanding of some critical issues for long-term stability in Central Asia. These are domestic matters related to institutions and governance with implications for human security and development: education, economy and equality.

A lamentable state of public education is nothing new in the region. The Soviet-time literacy rate was often stressed as a big difference between Central Asia and other parts of the world, under the colonial rule and not only. Few would hear similar bragging today. The countries of the region inherited fully state-funded and controlled education systems, focused on a solid primary and secondary education. Nowadays, the levels of Soviet-time funding on education could hardly be sustained. In addition to poor funding, outdated curricula, a deficit of well-trained and dedicated teachers and scarcity of updated teaching materials are exacerbated by political resistance to real reforms. National governments, particularly in resource-poor countries of the region, still struggle with very basic problems of the education system, such as the provision of textbooks and attracting good teachers. Nurseries, where three kids share a single bed, cold school rooms or universities where exam grades are bargained for cash, are not best practices which would allow healthy individuals and competent professionals to grow. Private schools offer better quality education, but they are mostly accessible for urban and rich groups of the society – in this way producing the elites that do not always speak the language of the population. A growing quality gap between urban and rural, or elite and “ordinary” schools, is a problem shared across the region, with huge implications for societal development in the decades to come.

The second area which poses a potential threat to stability is the limited development of small and medium enterprises (SME). Although economically the countries in the region are clearly on very different levels, some same problems are shared and need to be addressed by all of them. In oil-rich economies in the region, such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, few benefit from access to the resources and power. The state remains strong and the power of the state apparatus large thanks to energy revenues. In turn, in remittance-dependent economies, such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the state has nearly abandoned some of its primary services to the population (e.g. healthcare, education) while nevertheless retaining the control of the economy. Excessive control of the state, poor infrastructure and rampant corruption are some of the key factors squeezing small-scale economic activities or driving them underground. This leaves the SME sector under-developed, especially in rural areas. Allowing the growth of SME could provide opportunities for many active citizens without special “connections” or big capital to undertake economic activities, and in turn, create employment for other people and generate a higher tax income for the state.

Finally, equality understood as the rule of law and social justice is severely missing throughout the region. Political systems of all Central Asian states, although to a different extent, are dominated by strong personalities and an executive branch which enforces the situation in which the law follows politics, and not vice-versa. Laws might be in place; their non-selective execution and independent judiciary, however, remain to be seen. Implications of this can be seen in the daily lives of ordinary citizens, who mastered the “laws” of corruption, and for whom informal ways of addressing problems are a norm rather than an exception. The rule of law is often a part of donors’ agendas, although often it is reduced to capacity-building projects. Endless trainings might be somewhat useful, but one may wonder to what extent training judges or prosecutors improve social justice in countries where a phone call from the “right” person can play a greater role than a law.

Recommendations

The governments of Central Asian states differ in resources, capacity as well as openness to conduct much-needed reforms in the areas discussed above. The European Union and other international partners of Central Asia have an important role to play, although this might require calibrating approaches and efforts to particular countries. The following recommendations could be proposed:

• Define long-term stability as a condition that empowers citizens and creates the best possible opportunities for their physical, professional and intellectual development. Disentangling the concept of stability from an “absence of any change”, as it is commonly defined nowadays, to wider society-oriented notion will send an important political message to political and societal actors of the region.
• Encourage national governments to collaborate closely with relevant civil society actors in elaborating strategic reforms of the education sector. Encourage particular attention to streamlining curricula, improving learning outcomes assessment and motivating teachers. Support two-way exchange visits for students of high-schools and universities with their European counterparts.
• Support national governments in developing and implementing economic development programmes focusing on support to SME. Encourage active cooperation between respective national government agencies and private business associations, as well as businesses and civil society organisations in discussing matters of taxation, licensing and other aspects of state regulation of business. Provide direct support to already existing successful and socially oriented enterprises operating in poorer areas, instead of providing grants to form new ones from scratch.
• Stress the centrality of the rule of law and social justice in cooperation with the countries of the region. While small-scale capacity-building or awareness-raising projects may have their own benefits, long-term support to national-level programmes on fighting corruption, enforcing the law and institutionalising state-society collaboration is vital.

Shairbek Juraev and Karolina Kluczewska

^[1] The Curse of Stability in Central Asia, by Sarah Kendzior, 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/02/19/the-curse-of-stability-in-central-asia/.

^[2] Threat Perceptions in the OSCE Area, by OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, 2014, http://www.osce.org/networks/118080?download=tru.

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