Originally published in German as “Depolitisierte Politik: Die Parlamentswahlen 2025 in Kirgisistan,” Zentralasienanalysen, No. 171, 20 February 2026. The English version reproduced with permission.

Kyrgyzstan’s snap parliamentary elections of November 2025 passed with remarkably little public drama. There was no nervous anticipation or widespread political tension. In a country where parliamentary elections twice led to regime overthrow, this contest unfolded as a largely procedural event. For that very reason, it is analytically significant. Rather than marking a step toward regime consolidation, the elections served as a clear demonstration of how consolidated the current political system already is.

Three broader takeaways stand out. First, the 2025 vote confirmed one of the few enduring features of Kyrgyz politics: electoral rules change at every parliamentary cycle. This time, party-list proportional representation was abandoned in favor of a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system in multi-member districts. Second, the elections effectively closed Kyrgyzstan’s long-running experiment with party-based parliamentary politics. While party competition once promised institutionalized politics, it rarely produced parties resembling those found in model parliamentary systems. For much of society, the abandonment of party-list elections registered as little more than a footnote. Finally, the political context of the elections underscored Kyrgyzstan’s alignment with a broader regional, and arguably global, trend toward the strengthening of the executive at the expense of checks and balances.

New parliament by new rules

The 2025 elections confirmed a defining feature of Kyrgyzstan’s political trajectory: parliamentary elections are rarely held under unchanged rules. Since independence, Kyrgyzstan has never conducted two consecutive parliamentary elections using the same rules governing either the parliament’s structure or the electoral system (see Table 1). The only exception – the 2020 elections – ended with the annulment of the voting results.

The November 2025 elections represented yet another major redesign: a full transition to a majoritarian electoral model based on multi-member districts. In one sense, this marked a return to familiar territory – district-based majoritarian elections were used in 1995, 2000, and 2005. At the same time, the reform introduced an important novelty: the adoption of the SNTV system, under which each of 30 constituencies elected three parliament members.

Table 1. Changes in Kyrgyzstan’s Parliamentary Electoral System, 1995–2025

Under the new system, voters cast ballots exclusively for individual candidates, not for parties. Political parties were formally permitted to nominate candidates, but in practice only one party, Yntymak, did so. This outcome was not mechanically predetermined by the electoral formula. In other contexts, parties can and do dominate even under candidate-centered electoral rules. The marginal role of parties in the 2025 elections therefore reflects not only the design of the system, but also the broader irrelevance of parties as meaningful political institutions in Kyrgyzstan.

What do the elections mean institutionally?

The institutional implications of the 2025 elections become clearer when examining how the new electoral design reshapes incentives and outcomes.

First, multi-member districts introduce a stabilizing logic into electoral competition. By allowing more than one candidate to win in each constituency, the system reduces zero-sum outcomes and lowers the likelihood of narrow defeats. In theory, this can reduce political tension by ensuring that multiple resourceful local elites are incorporated into parliament. Such an arrangement helps blunt post-electoral tension, at least compared to the winner-takes-all systems.

Second, the multi-member format made it possible to integrate gender requirements into the electoral framework. The gender quota, first introduced in 2007, proved difficult to implement under proportional representation and would be virtually impossible under single-member districts. The current system requires the presence of both genders among elected candidates in each district, effectively reserving at least one seat for women or men. The gender quota may appear at odds with the country leadership‘s nationalist and socially conservative rhetoric. In practice, however, its enforcement reflects institutional inertia rather than genuine conviction. The quota carries low political cost – certainly lower than the reputational cost the government would incur by attempting to remove it.

Third, the new electoral system structurally sidelines political parties as collective actors. Although parties are formally permitted to nominate candidates, none except one chose to do so. Within days of the parliament’s first session, newly elected deputies organized themselves into so-called “deputy groups.” These groupings reflect residual provisions of parliamentary regulations. They allocate specific roles and resources to deputy groups – a mechanism originally introduced under the 2021 mixed system to allow majoritarian deputies to mirror party factions. These groups function as equivalents of party factions, giving individual deputies collective bargaining power, staff and office resources, and formal rights in legislation, oversight, and nominations that they would not have individually. The composition of these groups offers little evidence of coherent political alignment and does not suggest that they function as substitutes for parties as collective actors.

The end of the party experiment

The November 2025 elections abandoned the party-list electoral system. This came as the culmination of a long-term process rather than a sudden break. Moreover, rather than imposing new rules of politics, it formalized what had already become a reality: the irrelevance of parties on the ground.

While first parties emerged in the early 1990s, the origins of the current phase of party politics lie in 2010: the adoption of a new constitution with a loud rhetoric of building a parliamentary republic. While the 2010 constitution indeed expanded the powers of parliament, the system neither legally nor in practice evolved into a parliamentary model. Within two to three years, the presidency, under Almazbek Atambaev, successfully reasserted its de facto dominance.

Party-list proportional representation quickly revealed serious deficiencies in implementation. Under the closed-list system, voters had little influence over which individuals ultimately entered parliament. Party leadership retained extensive discretion over the ordering of lists and, crucially, over post-election substitutions. The practice of prominent figures withdrawing from party lists shortly after elections, allowing lower-ranked candidates to take their seats, was widely perceived as misleading voters and became a powerful symbol of “party corruption.” Over time, party lists came to be associated less with representation than with transactional politics.

The shift to open party lists in the 2021 elections was intended as a corrective. By allowing voters to cast ballots both for a party and for a preferred candidate within that party, the reform sought to introduce an element of accountability and restore public trust. In practice, however, open lists produced unintended effects: electoral competition shifted inward, with individual candidates competing against one another. As candidates turned to mobilizing personal networks in specific localities to secure preference votes, proportional representation with national party lists devolved into a de facto district-based contest.

By the time of the 2025 elections, party-based parliamentary politics had already lost much of its legitimacy. Political parties had never evolved into durable institutions of political competition; instead, they remained ad hoc and short-lived alliances formed for electoral access. Party switching by the same political figures across electoral cycles had become routine. Against this backdrop, the abandonment of party-list representation did not dismantle a functioning institutional arrangement but formalized the way politics already operated in Kyrgyzstan.

Conclusion

If the electoral outcomes themselves offer limited analytical insight, the broader context in which the 2025 elections were held is more revealing. Some analyses have interpreted the vote as a further step toward regime consolidation. Such readings, however, risk attributing undue causal weight to the elections themselves. The 2025 elections did not deepen consolidation so much as demonstrate it. The muted public reaction to the change in the electoral system, together with the swift and voluntary self-dissolution of the outgoing parliament, exposed a political environment largely devoid of political debate, let alone open dissent.

The resulting system is a centralized and personalized regime that enjoys a relatively high degree of public approval and faces limited international pressure – at least by standards of Kyrgyzstan’s previous governments. Such a configuration may offer stability and predictability, but it also carries an inherent risk of losing the capacity for self-correction in the absence of effective institutional counterweights. Kyrgyzstan’s political history serves as a reminder that a predictable and loyal parliament remains such only until it does not. The central question for the country’s political trajectory is therefore not electoral stability as such, but whether the governing system retains the capacity to reassess its own limits and adapt to recurrent social, political, and geopolitical pressures.

* The article was drafted in January 2026 and does not reflect subsequent developments.

The post Depoliticized politics: Kyrgyzstan’s 2025 parliamentary elections first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

As in the “colour revolutions” of the early 2000s, fraudulent elections became the starting point of the October events in Kyrgyzstan. Three parties (Birimdik, Mekenim Kyrgyzstan and Kyrgyzstan), loyal to President Sooronbai Jeenbekov, were declared the winners of the parliamentary elections on October 4, 2020. The election campaign was marked by massive vote-buying, mainly in favour of the above three parties. The next day, several thousand supporters of the parties that did not make it to parliament marched to demand new elections.

After several hours of confrontation with law enforcement agencies, protesters seized the government building, including the office of President Jeenbekov. The latter was neither seen nor heard, and the same could be said about the prime minister, the interior minister, and the police themselves. Following several days of anarchy, opposition politician Sadyr Japarov emerged as the leader of the street, and soon after, of the country. On the night of the unrest, he was released from prison (where he was serving a sentence for taking a hostage), and a few days later the country’s parliament elected Japarov as the new prime minister. Next day, President Jeenbekov announced his early resignation. Thus, he became the third president of Kyrgyzstan in the past 15 years ousted from power.

In addition to the classic and well-known set of problems (economic crisis, high levels of corruption, and low levels of trust in the authorities), two factors directly contributed to this turn of events. First, the high seven per cent electoral threshold left almost all opposition-minded parties, from socialists to nationalists, outside the parliament and united them into a single protest movement. The president’s team’s persistent efforts to reserve parliament for their loyal parties only made the situation worse.

Secondly, the country leaders and security officials proved utterly paralysed, as protests unfolded. The political weakness of President Jeenbekov was known, but the entire leadership of the country turned out to be just as helpless and absent. This may well be sufficient to explain why law enforcement forces disappeared from the streets. The previous “revolutions” experience would also prompt the police to withdraw for the risk of being beaten or ending up in a court.

The overthrow of President Jeenbekov upset a few people in Kyrgyzstan. Yet, few expected Japarov to become acting head of state. The latter is now handing out promises to the people and offices to his potential opponents. Few parties that led the post-election protests have remained outside the new regime. Others de facto joined Japarov’s team, citing the need to “save the country.”

A lack of legitimacy is haunting the new country leaders. However, consolidating the power position seems more urgent for them than reinstating the rule of law. Evidence of this is the “extension” of the powers of the current parliament for a sixth year, a direct violation of the country’s constitution. The protests on October 5 sought to cancel the parliamentary elections and declare new ones. As of now, however, new parliamentary elections will only happen after presidential elections in early January 2021, and the referendum on changes to the constitution.

Gaining international legitimacy has proved to be much more difficult. The neighbouring countries’ leaders jointly expressed concern about the situation but did little more than that. Russia, as “the most strategic partner”, tried to chip in but Dmitry Kozak’s visit didn’t result in anything. Moscow and Brussels have officially suspended the allocation of previously agreed financial injections until the situation normalizes.

The recent events exposed several factors that risk long-term stability in the country. First, the practice of overthrowing the government through street protests has become a “normal” phenomenon. Elections, in contrast, have failed to become an effective mechanism for power succession. The only precedent for a peaceful victory of the opposition remains the election of Askar Akayev as president of the then Kyrgyz “Soviet republic” in 1990. Since then, power on the “island of democracy” has been changed only by force, except cases when power was handed to the incumbent’s preferred choice.

The actions of the protesters who seized government buildings, as well as the disappearance of law enforcement officials, indicate that key actors, other than the country’s leaders, are learning from past mistakes. With fair elections still out of view, forceful seizure of power has emerged as an effective and proven way to fix the problem. Whether to call it a revolution or a coup is a secondary matter.

Furthermore, the return to the presidential system and majoritarian parliamentary elections, promised by Japarov, may lead to new rounds of political instability. The shameful implementation of “parliamentarism” by Atambayev and Jeenbekov (and by all the participating parties) discredited the concept, and revisionist ideas may find widespread support from the population. However, in the context of routine disregard for the law, the above changes will only strengthen the centralization of power and resources in the hands of a small group. Such developments in the past served to trigger widespread unrest.

The October events also demonstrated the growing appeal of national-populist forces. The electoral success of the Butun Kyrgyzstan, Mekenchil or Chon Kazat parties that used such rhetoric illustrates this trend. On the one hand, the growing political relevance of nationalism may indicate the increasing influence of ideas as opposed to the factor of money or administrative resources. Those keen on developing democracy in the country might have wanted just this. On the other hand, instructive is the experience of countries where, in the context of the economic crisis and the chronic corruption of the establishment, democratic procedures brought not-so democratic forces to power.

The fall of another political regime, mired in corruption and incapable of real reforms, means it should be a straightforward task for the new leaders to show the difference. The task requires real reforms in the economy and governance, fair political competition and, most importantly, a clear understanding of how and why the above should be achieved. Given the experience, few in Kyrgyzstan will trust the “revolutionary” forces by default. If the latter have ideas and political will for reforms, those must be made evident from day one.

Shairbek Dzhuraev, PhD, is co-founder and president of Crossroads Central Asia.

This is a translation of an article published at IPG-Journal (https://www.ipg-journal.io/regiony/azija/na-vyborakh-ne-svergnut-1179/)

The post The October events in Kyrgyzstan: the trap of street power? first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

Unfair elections, once again 

The current crisis was kicked-off with the parliamentary elections on 4 October 2020. Sixteen parties contested 120 seats in the unicameral Jogorku Kenesh, the national parliament. President Jeenbekov repeatedly denied supporting any party, but few in Kyrgyzstan believed such claims. Three parties were widely seen as the “pro-presidential troika”, including Birimdik, Mekenim Kyrgyzstan and Kyrgyzstan parties. They were packed by former government officials and wealthy businessmen, including many with shady backgrounds. President’s brother, Asylbek Jeenbekov oversaw Birimdik while Mekenim Kyrgyzstan belonged to Raimbek Matraimov, former deputy chief of the customs service, alleged to be the architect of sophisticated corruption schemes.

The election results confirmed a landslide victory for pro-presidential parties. Combined, they won 58% of votes but were poised to control 88% of seats if election results would hold (see Table 1). The only opposition party to gain seats, a nationalist-leaning Butun Kyrgyzstan, would be the smallest faction. In short, the results skewed the political balance as the 7% threshold excluded several bigger parties from the game. Some called the elections “the dirtiest” in the Kyrgyz history. This may not ring true to those who remember the Kyrgyz politics before 2010. However, the Sunday elections featured mass-scale vote-buying and use of administrative resources to the benefit of the above-listed troika.

Table 1: Preliminary results of parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan on 4 October 2020

Note: the election results were cancelled by the Central Election Commission and have no legal meaning.

* Table is created based on figures of the Central Election Commission at http://ess.shailoo.gov.kg on 12 October 2020.

The government collapsed the next day, on 5 October. Following the announcement of the early results, several opposition parties gathered in Bishkek’s main square, protesting the results and demanding new elections. Police used force to disperse the crowd, killing at least one and wounding hundreds in the process. However, within hours, people returned to the scene and captured the government building that hosts the president and the parliament. Protesters released several high-profile prisoners, including former president Atambaev, his close allies and the former parliament member Sadyr Japarov. President Jeenbekov, the government, parliament or law enforcement forces were nowhere to be seen or heard.

The power vacuum

In 2005 and 2010, the power changed hands in Kyrgyzstan when protesters took control over the government building. It was different this time. While the incumbent government was literally missing, no political group emerged to impose itself and assume political control. Eight parties formed a “coordination council” that called on the parliament to convene and create a new legitimate government. Next day, several smaller, and more radical, groups declared creating another “coordination council” which announced itself the only legitimate power in the country. In the heat of events, few took notice of it. In the meantime, Sadyr Japarov, a former MP, fresh from the prison, proclaimed himself new prime minister following a hasty meeting of the parliament in one of Bishkek’s hotels. Friday saw a showdown, with the former president Atambaev, joined by former prime minister Babanov, led their group to the main square only to get attacked by Japarov’s better-motivated supporters.

As political leaders remained busy trying to take control and prevent others from doing the same, various political groups started attacking government buildings across the country. Offices of the prosecutor general, oblast governors, city mayors and even heads of local municipalities change hands, sometimes more than once. Major businesses came under attack from crowds, including local and foreign mining companies. Bishkek’s residents once again showed up as “druzhinniki” to prevent looting in the city.

Opposition’s failure to assume political power after seizing the government buildings allowed President Jeenbekov to take a breath. On 9 October, he declared an emergency in Bishkek city, ordering the military to secure the city. He also invited the parliament to convene at his Ala Archa residence in the southern part of Bishkek to vote for prime minister. On 10 October, the parliament voted Sadyr Japarov as prime minister. The same day, former president Atambaev was arrested, reportedly for instigating mass disorder.

The election of Sadyr Japarov as prime minister on Saturday (much to the joy of his very loud and aggressive supporters) will likely be revisited in the coming days. Analysts and politicians, including some known for unwavering support for president Jeenbekov, claimed the parliament had no quorum, and thus, the vote for Japarov had no legal meaning. Therefore, this week the president will surprise many, no matter whether he confirms Japarov as prime minister and resigns himself, or refuses to resign and gets the parliament to replace Japarov with someone of his own choice.

Key themes to follow

The above narrative is inevitably incomplete. Some details will prove irrelevant, and others will emerge important precursors of more significant changes. Events are unfolding and theories on “who is behind what” keep changing every day. Nonetheless, there are several themes that keen observers of Kyrgyz politics will take note of in the developments of the past week.

Rehearsal for a presidential transition?

The current events are very much about the next “patron”. President Jeenbekov’s term ends in 2023, and the Constitution does not allow a second term for presidents. Being a former president in Kyrgyzstan is a risky business. If Akaev and Bakiev fled the country from the popular uprising, Jeenbekov himself oversaw the jailing of his predecessor, Atambaev. Packing the parliament with loyal parties would allow greater freedom to devise plans for a smooth and secure power transition. By the same token, for most opposition leaders, at stake is the president’s seat.

The above is a reminder that Kyrgyzstan remains a system dominated by the president despite all talk of parliamentary democracy. Several parties that ran for elections called for a switch back to the presidential system. However, even without that, both Jeenbekov and his predecessor Atambaev demonstrated how presidents could reduce the parliament to a rubber stamp agency. There is much work ahead before the politics in the country catches up with the spirit of the Constitution.

Organized crime and disorganized government

The events once again exposed the growing role of organized crime in Kyrgyz politics. This is not news in Kyrgyzstan; many active politicians, including some party leaders, have semi-criminal (meaning criminal but legally not) background. In the past week, widespread reports pointed to criminal groups among the protesting crowds of different stripes. Acknowledging the issue, civil activists gathered a massive protest action named “The country without organized crime”. At the same time, the deputy speaker of the parliament Aida Kasymalieva reported she and other MPs were directly threatened by colleagues with criminal links.

The opaqueness of how the criminal “underworld” communicates and collaborates with politicians often relegates the subject to a footnote. The rise of Raim Matraimov as a not-so-secret grey cardinal of the Kyrgyz politics of the past years, the massive reference to “chernyie” (blacks, a reference to organized crime group members) during both election campaign and events of the past week suggest more research is needed to establish which boss is the real one in the country. Illustrative is the confession of Omurbek Suvanaliev, until recently deputy secretary of the country’s security council, who said “The situation is this – criminals have prevailed over politicians. All politicians are afraid that they will be beaten, their firms will be attacked, their houses will be set in fire, they will be ‘taxed’ and so on.”

Liberals and nationalists? 

Most political parties in Kyrgyzstan remain ad hoc associations to get individuals into parliament. There is a degree of consensus among local analysts that reading party programs is a waste of one’s time. At the same time, the recent developments suggested an ideological divide between liberal and conservative groups is becoming more evident. Both groups made their presence much more visible than in the past. This is less relevant to the events of the day but likely more relevant for the years to come.

A newly created Reforma party stood out for its radical call for riddance of the old political establishment. Ata Meken and Bir Bol parties packed the top of the party lists with well-known civil society activists and businessmen. Calling the above a liberal camp would be an overstretch at the moment. Moreover, the chances remain slim for this group to reach executive power via free and fair elections. However, during the current events, this group stood out as an anti-establishment, anti-nationalist and pro-democracy group able to mobilize supporters in Bishkek. The lack of unity, particularly on whether or not to pragmatically join forces with some old guard politicians will remain the biggest challenge for the group.

Mirroring the pro-reform group above, populist-nationalist groups have also been on the rise. Election results gave a boost to Adakhan Madumarov and his Butun Kyrgyzstan, Kamchybek Tashiev and Sadyr Japarov of Mekenchil party. These are politicians that readily resort to the rhetoric of order, nationalism as well as the nationalization of major companies such as gold mining. The above contains more populism than anything else. However, the strong support they see through a ballot, in social media and on the street suggests the base for such politicians is more likely to grow than diminish.

External hands?

Finally, there is a question of whether we see a pair of external hands behind the events in Bishkek. The matter is as opaque as the role of criminal bosses: all seem to know something but little more than that. Russia is the single dominant partner in Kyrgyzstan and will always find parties readily seeking its advice. Moreover, any turmoil featuring a stalemate situation increases chances for the third parties to weigh in. However, the public part of the electoral campaign and clashes on the streets of Bishkek will be of little interest for geopolitics-minded observers. Having foreign advisors is commonplace for Kyrgyz politicians but having a debate on foreign policy is much less so.

Shairbek Dzhuraev is co-founder and president of Crossroads Central Asia.

• The photo on the front page courtesy of Vladimir Voronin/Associated Press

The post Turbulence in Kyrgyzstan: a hijacked revolution or business as usual? first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

The country’s parliament is a collegial body. There are reasons for this. First, the essence of parliament is to limit the power of one person, be it a monarch or a president. Secondly, the large number of members of parliament is a guarantee of adequate representation of various social groups (by gender, level of wealth, sector of the economy, religion or nationality, age, etc.). Thirdly, a large number of members of parliament is a way to ensure better the quality of the adopted bills. Debate and consideration of different aspects of a problem are impossible when the decision is made by one person or his / her circle of loyal allies.

However, the experience (especially of totalitarian systems) demonstrates that a large body of parliament does not always perform the above functions. Instead of being a place for debate, different opinions and a struggle between supporters and opponents of an idea, a parliament can turn into a rubber-stamping agency. One way to assess the extent to which the country’s parliament is indeed a platform for different opinions, different views and ideologies (as it should be in such a multi-party parliament as the current Kyrgyz parliament) is to assess the level of diversity of opinions and divergences in the voting process.

How does the current Kyrgyz parliament score on the vote division? Several graphs illustrate it. Thus, as Graph 1 shows, in 99.27% instances of plenary voting, a bill was approved while only in 0.72% of cases the MPs voted down the proposed legislation. Graph # 2 shows the result of a typical, or average, voting on a bill in Jogorku Kenesh. The figures are the average indicators based on the results of 1784 voting protocols entered into the database of this portal. It suggests that out of 120 MPs, 102 would routinely vote in favour of a bill, 2.8 MPs would vote against, and 14 MPs would be absent. Finally, Graph # 3 demonstrates, in greater detail, the level of unanimity or difference among MPs. Out of 1,784 instances of voting on a bill, 1,124 were approved unanimously. In 480 cases the voting revealed less than 5 MPs voting against the bill.

Data is retrieved from an online portal “This is your parliament”. It is produced by Crossroads Central Asia with support of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) project “Strong parliamentary democracy with active participation of citizens” implemented by UNDP in the Kyrgyz Republic.

The post Voting patterns in the Kyrgyz parliament first appeared on Crossroads Central Asia.

This dominant organizational strategy commonly prioritized amongst party elites in Kyrgyzstan reflects both the institutional nature of party formation and the logic of electoral mobilization. In reality, parties in Kyrgyzstan, and elsewhere in new democracies, tend to be formed predominantly by extant elite groups to preserve the ‘party in public office’ or seek political offices. In older democratic polities, grassroots organization-building preceded party-based political competition and remained an essential task for parties in terms of sustaining party-society linkages and maximizing electoral gains. In its turn, the logic of electoral mobilization, conditioned by both exogenous and endogenous factors, dictates that parties manage to secure electoral support and its survival by avoiding extensive membership-based organizations and efficiently employing modern election campaign strategies, such as the recruitment of campaign professionals and extensive usage of media marketing tactics to enhance party or candidate visibility.

The above trends, noticed similarly across established democracies, further induce party leaders to recruit prominent public figures, including former public servants and business persons, as party-fielded candidates to share campaign-related expenditures. Such a strategic necessity to recruit ambitious and resourceful candidates, however, tends to prompt post-electoral internal party tensions as partly leaders remain committed to centralized decision-making, including on matters of coalition negotiations.

As observed in election campaigns, party mobilization strategies in Kyrgyzstan typically tend to entail, beyond media marketing campaign strategies (e.g. billboard campaigns and political ads), the deployment of loosely organized, transient and unstable clientelistic networks and the employment of divergent practices of electoral clientelism, including political patronage, illicit vote-buying and sponsoring infrastructure development projects.

Beyond the electorally-driven incentives affecting both organizational and mobilizational strategies pursued by elite groups, the observed patterns are further conditioned by the non-conspicuity of social cleavage dimensions that would otherwise be completing the ideological space for political and electoral competition. This holds implications for organizational structures. Parties, in the absence of solid social-structural and attitudinal bases of electoral support, would be less inclined to invest in building an extensive network of local party organizations and promoting internal accountability mechanisms in order to sustain linkages with the targeted electorate and maximize electoral gains. In post-communist East-Central Europe, which exhibited higher levels of the party and party system institutionalization across new democracies, the electoral success of leading parties was consistently attributed to investments made by party elites in building large local organizations and complex party structures for internal coordination and decision-making. In turn, the variation in party organizational strength was contingent on the ability and strategy of party elites to adjust to broader institutional and social conditions, including by structuring existing social cleavages, which tend to be relatively robust and salient, for electoral purposes. In a similar vein, the profound weakness of both social and ideological underpinnings of party formation and development in Kyrgyzstan has further conditioned the prevalence of clientelistic and personalistic appeals of voter mobilization overshadowing programmatic appeals based on credible policy-based commitments to voters.

The observed multiplicity of potential causal factors implies that the patterns of party organization and mobilization need to be examined within a broader social-structural and institutional context and based on the concurrent investigation of political incentive structures shaping the behaviour, perceptions and strategic choices of political actors in new democracies. As inferred, political actors can potentially manipulate institutional and electoral rules for political purposes to consolidate power and gain an advantage over opponents, in a way that the process of democratization and party development could be subverted. That said, it was also evident that while a conducive institutional environment, reflecting a combination of political actor preferences, elite compromises and popular pressure, the patterns of party institutionalization tend to be fundamentally conditioned by social-structural precursors. In effect, this suggests that party-building process, viewed as both a catalyst and a crucial component of the broader democratization process, unfolds alongside socio-economic development and technological advancements associated with strengthening democratic governance, civil society and associational life.

On a practical level, and in the light of continued disillusionment with party politics in Kyrgyzstan, the process of institutionalization, and hence democratization, can be potentially instigated and facilitated by ensuring that institutional and legal settings further promote ‘parliamentarism’ and incentivize party elites to invest in fostering internal democratic structures and compete on an even playing field. In practice, this would entail making revisions to the party legislation stipulating the implementation of democratic procedures for party leadership selection and integrating internal accountability mechanisms.

At the same time, and given the saliency of financial resources for maintaining party organizations and conducting election campaigns, it would be equally critical to find ways to provide public financing to parties (e.g. extending free political advertisement on state-owned media outlets). This particularly applies to parties that might have failed to secure parliamentary seats but hold the potential to evolve into a viable political organization based on internal democratic structures and promoting an issue-based political agenda.

Dr Emir Kulov is Chair and Associate Professor at the Department of International and Comparative Politics, American University of Central Asia.

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